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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
RORY J. ATCITTY, by and
through his parent Roger
Atcitty, Sr.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. 980096-CA

v,
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
SAN JUAN COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT, LYMAN GROVER,
Priority No. 15
Defendants and Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated § 78-2-2(4).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether the trial court erred when it denied Plaintiff's

Motion For Partial Summary Judgment, R. 884-892.
2.

Whether the trial court erred when it entered summary

judgment for defendants, while summarily dismissing the issues of
the

impartiality

District's

of

policies

the
were

disciplinarian,
vague

and

the

claim

ambiguous,

and

that

the

whether

defendants7 action deprived Plaintiff of his liberty interest.

R.

884-892.
3.

Whether the trial court erred when it denied Plaintiff's
1

Motion To Amend The Complaint. R. 884-892.
Legal determinations regarding summary judgment are questions
of law and are reviewed for correctness in determining that the
party is not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Salt
Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp. , 913 P.2d 731, 733 (Utah
1995); See also Rule 56(c), Ut. R. Civ. P. (Summary judgment may be
granted only when the record shows that there were no genuine
issues of material fact and the party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.) x
Legal determinations regarding amendments are reviewed for
abuse of discretion. See Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P. 2d 1381, 1389 (Utah
1996) .
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Short-term-school suspensions are governed by the Due Process
Clause

of

the

Fourteenth

Amendment

to

the

United

States

Constitution (see Addendum 1) P as construed in Goss v. Lopez, 419

1

Because entitlement to summary judgment is a question of
law, the reviewing court accords no deference to the trial court's
resolution of the legal issues presented. K & T Inc. v. Koroulisf
888 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1994).
In examining the trial court's
order granting summary judgment, the reviewing court determines
only whether the trial court correctly held that there were no
disputed issues of material fact. id. The reviewing court views
the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Higgins v. Salt Lake
County, 855 P. 2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). The reviewing court may
affirm summary judgment on any available ground even if it is one
not relied upon by the trial court. Id. at 235. The standard for
review regarding the court's denial of plaintiff's motion to strike
defendants' summary judgment affidavit is that a reviewing court
will review the ruling for correctness, determining whether the
affidavit in question improperly attempted to create disputed
issues of fact. See Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1173 (Utah
1983); Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130, 1140-1141 (Utah App. 1990).
2

U.S.

565

(1975)

(see

Addendum

2).

The

nature,

scope

and

application of Goss is dependent on the facts and circumstances of
the particular case.
The summary judgment process is governed by Rule 56, Ut.R.Civ.
P. (See Addendum 3) . This Courts review of the granting or denial
of summary judgment is governed by the case law set forth in the
Statement of Issues,

supra.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from a judgment of the trial court granting
Defendants7 summary judgment which entirely disposed of Plaintiff's
claim that due process was violated during the course of his shortterm suspension from school.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

On May 17, 1996, Rory Atcitty

(hereafter, Rory), a minor

child, and through his parent, Roger Atcitty, Sr. (hereafter, Mr.
Atcitty), filed an action in the Seventh District Court for San
Juan County pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he had been
denied due process when suspended from school for ten days.
5.

R. 1-

On May 20, 1996, Plaintiff filed a Motion for a Temporary

Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction seeking reinstatement
in school.
139-142.

R. 13-14.

The Motion was denied on August 1, 1996. R.

Defendants filed an Answer on May 31, 1996. R. 46-51.

On

September 26, 1996 the trial court entered a protective order
regarding

the

disclosure

records. R. 171-172.

and

use

of

certain

school

district

On October 23, 1996, the trial court granted
3

in part and denied in part Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Certain
Defenses.

R. 183-184.

On February 14, 1997, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment. R. 204-205. On February 27, 1997, Defendants
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 473-475. On March 6, 1997,
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint and
an Amended Complaint.

R. 678-688.

On March 17, 1997, Plaintiff

filed a Motion to Strike an Affidavit of Lyman Grover submitted in
support of the Defendants7 Summary Judgment Motion. R. 722-723. On
April 2, 1997, oral argument was heard on all pending motions.
938.

R.

On July 1, 1997, the trial court issued a Memorandum Ruling

on all pending motions (see Addendum 4a-4d^) . On October 30, 1997,
the trial court entered summary judgment for defendants, denied
Plaintiff's Partial Summary Judgment Motion, denied Plaintiff's
Motion to Amend the Complaint, and denied Plaintiff's Motion to
Strike the Lyman Grover Affidavit.

R. 884-892.

On November 24,

1997, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal. R. 903-904.2
C.
On October

DISPOSITION BY THE TRIAL COURT

30, 1997, the trial court entered

2

a

judgment

On December 10, 1997, Plaintiff filed a docketing statement.
On December 18, 1997, Defendants filed in the trial court a Motion
to Compel the Production of the Transcript of the April 2, 1997
arguments on the pending motions. R. 914-918.
On January 12,
1998, the trial court ruled that the transcript should be part of
the record on appeal, that Plaintiff should request the transcript,
and that the defendants should pay for the transcript. R. 932-935.
On December 18, 1997 Defendants filed in the Supreme Court a Motion
to Dismiss Parts of Appellant's appeal. On January 5, 1998, the
Supreme Court deferred ruling on the motion and instructed the
parties to proceed to the next stage of the appellate process. On
February 19, 1998, the Supreme Court entered an Order assigning the
case to the Utah Court of Appeals.
4

granting summary judgment for defendants.

At the same time, the

trial court also entered orders denying Plaintiff's Motions for
Partial Summary Judgment, Motion to Strike a Summary Judgment
Affidavit of Lyman Grover, and a Motion for Leave to File an
Amended Complaint. The trial court's judgment and orders disposed
of the merits of the case. The trial court ruled that Rory Atcitty
was not deprived of due process when he was suspended from school.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light
most favorable to Rory Atcitty are as follows:
On May 13, 1996, Lyman Grover, the principal of Whitehorse
High School, a secondary education facility operated by the San
Juan County School District, was investigating the alleged use of
marijuana by students on a band trip to Colorado. Lyman Grover
Depositionf R. 940, Page 9.

Mr. Grover considered the incident a

police matter, Id. at Pages 30-31, and considered it to be so from
the outset of his involvement in the matter. Id. at Pages 13-14.
Mr. Grover's actions were in accordance with District policy
requiring that principals involve the police when crimes have been
committed and that charges be brought. San Juan County School
District Memorandum, April 25, 1994, R. 415-416; San Juan County
School District Memorandum, September 29f 1993f R. 418; San Juan
County School District Policy Number 7333, R. 236. The policies,
however, are silent as to how or when law enforcement should be
involved or to what degree law enforcement should affect the
suspension process. Id.

Mr. Grover's intention was to refer the
5

matter to law enforcement and thereby restrict his authority to
act. Lyman Grover

Deposition, R.

940, at Pages

13-14.

He

considered his role as gathering information for law enforcement.
Id. at Pages 37, 53-54.

Accordingly, he provided reports of

student interviews and summaries of his investigation only to the
police and compelled the students, including Rory, to go to a
meeting with a police officer where they could be interrogated and
arrested. Id. at Pages 31-33, 35-38, 39.

Mr. Atcitty likewise

considered the allegations and Mr. Grover's investigation to be
criminal in nature and that his son could be charged with a crime.
Roger Atcitty, Sr. Deposition, R. 939 at Pages 7-9.

Accordingly,

Mr. Atcitty instructed Rory that he should not talk with the
principal unless he was present. Id. Mr. Atcitty made arrangements
to retain legal counsel and so informed Mr. Grover. Lyman Grover
Depositionf R. 940, at Page 20.
On May 13, Mr. Grover learned that Rory may have been involved
in the band-trip incident. Lyman Grover Depositionf R. 940, at
Pages 10, 12. Mr. Grover spoke with Rory's father, provided some
information to the parent about the matter, but refused to provide
the names of others who had important information about the
incident. Id. at Pages 15-16.

He also told Mr. Atcitty that he

would make no deals concerning Rory's situation. Id* at Page 17.
Mr. Grover explained some of the procedures relating to the
investigation, and assured Mr. Atcitty that Rory had the right to
face his accusers under some circumstances. Id. at Pages 17-18.
Mr. Grover failed to advise Mr. Atcitty of suspension procedures,
6

including the District's ten-day suspension policy for first-time
drug violations, and did not identify other possible terms of
suspension or other punishment. Id. at Pages 18-19.

Mr. Grover

likewise failed to mention alternate-education services, hearing
procedures for aggrieved students before the Board of Education,
the right of a post-suspension parent conference, not did he inform
Mr. Atcitty of whether, and when, Rory would be provided an
opportunity to present his side of the story, id.

Mr. Grover

testified that at the time he was talking with the parents, he was
not sure that he was referring to a short-term suspension or an
expulsion, each of which has different procedures and consequences.
Id. at Page 19.

Mr. Grover testified that Mr. Atcitty told him

that he was not talk to Rory unless he was present, id. at Pages
23-25, and although the principal intended to question Rory, he
never responded to Mr. Atcitty7s request not to speak with Rory.
Id. at Pages 20, 23. Mr. Grover did not attempt to speak with Rory
on May 13, when Mr. Atcitty was available. See Id. at Pages 14-22.
Although Rory's father requested that Mr. Grover provide a
hearing and an explanation of the process involved, neither were
provided. Roger Atcitty Sr. Depositionf R. 939, at Pages 24, 26.
District policies and procedures were unclear as to exactly when in
the expulsion or suspension process the student would be afforded
an opportunity to present his side of the story,3 or exactly when

3

However, apparently this opportunity was meant to be
afforded only at the time when the principal announced his
disciplinary decision. See Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, Pages
28, 18-19.
7

or under what circumstances the student must be warned of the
consequences if he chooses to not tell his side of the story when
given that opportunity. Compare, Plaintiffs

Summary Judgment

Exhibits 1(a) through 1(e), R. 233-348.
On May 14, 1996, Mr. Grover attempted to question Rory about
the incident when they were alone and without Mr. Atcitty being
present, Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 23-27, but Rory
refused to talk to him. Id. at Page 25.

The purpose of this

meeting was to enable Mr. Grover to ask questions about the alleged
incident. Rory Atcitty Deposition, R. 941, at Pages 29-34. During
this encounter Rory was not told he was suspended nor was he
informed about suspension procedures, Id. at 28, about hearing
procedures, possible punishments, his right to a post-suspension
parent conference, or that disciplinary measures were going to be
taken against him. .Id. at 24-37.

Rory did not have the evidence

which was the basis of the allegations explained to him, and most
significantly, was not warned of the consequences of not discussing
the matter, or that this was his only chance to tell his side of
the story. Id.
That same day, in response to a telephone call from his son,
Mr. Atcitty went to the school and had a brief conversation with
Mr. Grover, again stressing he did not want his son to discuss the
incident with school officials because of the criminal nature of
the situation unless he was present. Roger Atcitty Sr. Deposition,
R. 939, Pages 9, 7-8 (emphasis added). Again, Mr. Grover failed to
inform Mr. Atcitty of the disciplinary procedures or process. Lyman
8

Grover Deposition. R. 940, at Page 28, despite Mr. Atcitty having
asked for this information. Roger Atcitty Sr. Deposition,, R. 939,
at Page 24.

Mr. Grover testified that his policy was to not

explain what the suspension procedures were to the students until
he had decided what action to take. Lyman Grover Deposition, R.
940, at Page 28. Mr. Grover further testified that he had not
decided what to do with Rory at that point other than, as he told
Mr. Atcitty, Id., that he was continuing his investigation. Roger
Atcitty, Sr. Deposition, R. 939, at Pages 9-10. He did not warn Mr.
Atcitty that this would be Rory,s only opportunity to be heard.
Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 22-28. Mr. Atcitty left
his encounter with the principal at "a total loss" as to what was
going to happen next. Id. at Page 8.
On May 16, 1996, Mr. Grover called law enforcement. Lyman
Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 30-31.

A police officer

arrived and was given the students' statements and other reports.
Id. at Pages 37, 53-54. The students alleged to be involved in the
incident were then called to the principal's office, informed that
they were suspended from school, Id. at Pages 36-37, and then were
interrogated by the police officer. Id. at Pages 36-39.
During the officer's interrogation, Rory denied being involved
in the incident. Lyman Grover Affidavit, R. 513, 516, f 9.

The

officer then arrested the students and placed them in police
custody. Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Page 39. At no time
during this confrontation
including

did Mr. Grover tell the students,

Rory, about hearing procedures, alternate-education
9

services, alternatives regarding punishment, the right to a postsuspension parent conference, provide them with the right to give
their side of the story, or give them the right to speak in
mitigation of punishment. Id. at Pages 36-37. Ignoring Rory's
statement, Mr. Grover later gave Mr. Atcitty a notice of suspension
which

claimed

that

Rory

said

nothing.

See

Student

Behavior

Referral, R. 420.
Following his suspension and arrest, Rory was allowed to
remain at school while his parents were contacted. Lyman Grover
Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 40-42. Mr. Atcitty was called to the
school and upon arriving spoke briefly with Mr. Grover. id. at
Pages 40-42.

Mr. Grover advised Mr. Atcitty of Rory's suspension

from school. Id. at Pages 41-43. Mr. Grover explained some of the
terms of the suspension and provided Mr. Atcitty with a notice of
suspension. Id.

Mr. Grover also failed to advise Mr. Atcitty of

District's policies and procedures other than to tell Mr. Atcitty
that

Rory

would

have

to

find

and

participate

in

a

drug

rehabilitation program if he wanted to come back to school before
the end of the ten-day suspension period. Id.
During the suspension, the District provided

some home-

schooling services to Rory. Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at
Pages 44-49.

However, it was not until six days after Rory was

suspended that he began receiving home-schooling services. Roger
Atcitty Sr. Deposition, R. 939, at Pages 16-18. The reason for the
delay was that the school had no home-schooling program in place.
Id. at Pages 13-18.

Mr. Grover indicated that he received daily
10

reports and there was no indication that Rory was uncooperative in
the home-schooling program. Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at
Page 48.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in denying Plaintiff a partial summary
judgment because there were no disputed issues of material fact and
Plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
On May 13-14, Mr. Grover met with Mr. Atcitty.

On neither

occasion did Mr. Grover provide Mr. Atcitty (or Rory) with the
suspension policies and procedures, or with a specific explanation
of the basis for the allegations about drug use on a school band
trip.

On May 14, Mr. Grover questioned Rory but did not tell him

he was being suspended or that this encounter was actually a
hearing after which he would have no further opportunity to give
his side of the story.

Rory and his father had every reasonable

expectation that they would be given an opportunity to speak at
some

later

time,

and

that

they

would

be

given

additional

information about the procedures and disciplinary process, that
they would be informed of the basis of the allegations.

Neither

encounter, therefore, was a hearing and did not constitute a
meaningful opportunity to be heard.
The May 16th meeting between Rory, the other students, Mr.
Grover, and the police officer was not a meaningful opportunity to
be heard.

Mr. Grover only announced Rory's suspension without

giving Rory the opportunity to be heard and without providing him
with important information about the suspension process, including
11

post-suspension services.

This encounter was primarily for the

purpose of enabling the police to interrogate and arrest Rory. An
encounter later in the day between Mr. Grover and Mr. Atcitty
likewise did not satisfy Due Process requirements.

Under the

circumstances of Rory's suspension, he should have, but was not,
afforded enhanced due process protection, including the right to a
clear and specific description of the evidence, the right to
confront his accusers, and the right to have his parents and
counsel present. The denial of these rights was compounded by the
fact that Mr. Grover was not impartial because he had a law
enforcement agenda and role.

Moreover, Mr. Grover had taken a

hard-line position that he would not ameliorate Rory's situation in
any way

even

though

at the time he made

investigation was not complete.

this comment the

In addition, Rory was denied

adequate home-schooling services during his suspension, benefits
that were required as part of the fair-hearing process.
The trial court erred in granting Defendants7 summary judgment
because (1) Defendants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of
law, and (2) there were disputed issues of material fact.

The

trial court also erred in denying Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Mr.
Grover's Affidavit.

This affidavit was submitted to support

Defendants' claim for summary judgment and to raise purported
disputed facts to frustrate Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Motion.
The trial court erred in denying Plaintiff leave to file an
amended complaint because the motion was timely, raised no new
issues,

and

otherwise

complied
12

with

procedural

requirements

relating to amendment of pleadings.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
PLAINTIFF A SUMMARY JUDGMENT
a. Introduction, Summary Judgment Standards.
Rory

Atcitty

was

entitled

to

a

summary

judgment

on

the

question of whether he had notice and an adequate and timely
opportunity to be heard.4

On this point the essential facts are

undisputed, making summary judgment appropriate because Rory was
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Bruce v. Martin Marietta
Corp. , 544 F.2d 422, 445 (10th Cir. 1976) (quoting Rule 56(c));
Andreini v. Hultcrren. 860 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah 1993). 5
4

There is a pending motion by Appellees to dismiss this
portion of the appeal. If the motion is granted, Appellant asks
that this Court take into account the arguments made in this
section of the brief when considering whether the trial court
should have granted defendants summary judgment. See Point 2.
5

Only the due process issues are discussed in this portion of
Appellants' brief.
The other elements of Rory 7 s claim were
admitted by the defendants: Rory J. Atcitty was a minor child
bringing the action through his parent, Roger J. Atcitty,
Plaintiff's Verified Complaint, R. 1, f 1, Defendants' Answer, R.
46, fl I.A; Rory was a student living at Bluff, San Juan County,
Utah and attending a secondary education facility known as
Whitehorse High School at Montezuma Creek, Utah. Plaintiff7s
Verified Complaint, R. 1, f 1, Defendants7 Answer, R. 46-47, \ I.A;
Defendant Board of Education of The San Juan County School District
is the duly elected administrative and governing body of the San
Juan School District in San Juan County, Utah. Plaintiffs Verified
ComplaintP R. 1-2, J 2, Defendants7 Answer, R. 46-47, f I.A.; Lyman
Grover is an employee of the District and the principal of
Whitehorse High School. Plaintiffs Verified Complaint, R. 2, f 3,
Defendants7 Answer, R. 46-47, \ I.A; Defendants7 actions were taken
under the color of laws, customs, and practices of the State of
Utah, and under the color of their respective offices as officers
and agents of the State of Utah, Plaintiff7s Verified Complaintf R.
2, J 4, Defendants7 Answer, R. 46-47, f I.A.
13

b. Introduction, Due Process In Education Standards.
A student's interest in a public education is a property
interest. Meyers v. Bd. Of Educ. Of San Juan, 905 F.Supp. 1544,
1557-1559, 1568-1569 (D. Utah. 1995); Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).6

This property interest is protected by

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565, 572-576; Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 850 (10th
Cir. 1975).

The review of due process procedures is measured by

federal law. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 152 (1988) (federal
law applies in state-court Section 1983 actions); Lucas v. Murray
City Civil Service Commission, 331 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 17 (Utah App.
1997). Minimum due process requirements imposed by federal law may
not be diminished by state law. Id.
In Goss, the Court held that a student facing
suspension

for disciplinary

reasons

short-term

is entitled to a hearing,

stating "that the student be given oral or written notice of the
charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the
evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his
side of the story."

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581.

6

The Court

Property interests "are created by and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law." Board Of Regents v. Rothr
408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). The property interest in education is
recognized under Utah state law. See, e.g., Utah Constitutionr
Article X, §§ 1 & 2; Article II, Fourth; Act of July 16, 1894, Ch.
138, § 3, Fourth, 28 Stat. 107, 108 (1893-95); Logan City Sch.
Dist. v. Kowallis, 77 P.2d 348, 350-351 (Utah 1938); Utah Code Ann.
§ 53A-17a-102(l) (1994). Although Rory's property interest in
education has been long established, cases such as Meyers only
recently compelled the San Juan School District to recognize its
obligation to educate Native Americans children. See also Seamons
v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1234 (10th Cir. 1996).
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also reasoned that student suspensions sufficiently resembled
traditional judicial and administrative fact finding hearings and
therefore a hearing was appropriate, id. at 583-584; see also Board
of Curators, Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 88-89 (1977).
Due process requires that one be given the opportunity to be
heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Armstrong
v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).

This opportunity to be heard

must be flexible and appropriate to the nature of the case.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); Lucas
v. Murray City Civil Service Commission, 331 Utah Adv. Rep. 15,
n.4.
Once it is determined that education is a protected property
interest, the next question is how much process is due. Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (1972).

Following Goss, the Supreme

Court clarified how much due process is due by adopting a threefactor balancing test. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
These factors must be applied in a flexible manner and tailored to
the circumstances of each particular case.7 The interpretation of
the Due Process Clause therefore involves intensely practical
applications in a manner which precludes "any concept of inflexible
procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation."
Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); see also
7

The three factors are (1) the private interest that will be
affected, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value of additional
or substitute procedural safeguards, and (3) the government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that additional or substitute procedural
safeguards would entail. Id. at 335.
15

Roach v. University of Utah, 968 F.Supp. 1446, 1451 (D.Utah 1997).
c. Initial Encounters Between Student, Parent And Principal.
(1) Notice Of The Opportunity To Be Heard.
Rory and his father had two encounters with Mr. Grover on May
13-14, during the initial investigation of the allegations that
students had used marijuana on a school band trip.

Neither

encounter was a constitutionally adequate due-process "hearing"
because Rory was never provided with an opportunity to be heard "at
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Armstrong v. Manzo,
380 U.S. 545, 552. A prerequisite to the right to be meaningfully
heard is adequate notice. Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 3 39
U.S. 306, 313.
Notice sufficient to alert Rory about the allegations, that he
was being suspended, an explanation of the disciplinary process,
and that he had a definite time in which to respond to the
principal's action is required by Due Process before the action is
taken. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582, 584; Cleveland Board
of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (Notice, an
explanation of the evidence, and the opportunity to be heard are
necessary before

action is taken (emphasis in original)); see also

Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 115 (1990); James v. Unified
School Dist. No. 512, 899 F.Supp. 530, 535 (D.Kan. 1995); Lucas v.
Murray City Civil Service Commission, 331 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 18
(citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.. 339 U.S. 306,
313).

The first two encounters failed to comply with these

standards as well.
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On May 13, when Mr. Grover spoke with Mr. Atcitty, he gave him
a cursory description of the situation.

Mr. Atcitty attempted to

informally resolve the matter, but Mr. Grover, despite his not
having finished his investigation and despite not being in full
possession of the facts, took a hard line attitude that there would
be no deals or accommodations. Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at
Page 17. Mr. Atcitty responded by saying that he did not want his
son interrogated unless he was present.
On May 14, Mr. Grover did approach Rory without any regard to
Mr. Atcitty7s concern about the criminal nature of the accusations
or his desire to be present. Mr. Grover failed to warn Rory that
this meeting was actually a "hearing" and that it would be his only
opportunity to defend himself.

This was not adequate notice.

Moreover, there was nothing in the confused multitude of rules and
policies and student handbooks that would have placed Rory on
notice that this would be his only opportunity to state his side of
the story.

Indeed, a reasonable

reading

of the

facts and

circumstances in a light most favorable to Rory shows that both he
and his father went away from the first encounter with Mr. Atcitty
(on May 13) with the feeling that they would have an opportunity to
be heard at a later time.

Another reasonable assumption by Rory

and his father was that this stage of the process was merely factfinding and not adjudicative.

Mr. Grover testified that he was

simply conducting an investigation at that point, one that would
continue

following his brief talk with the Atcittys.

Rory

testified that the meeting was only used by Mr. Grover to ask
17

questions about the alleged incident. Rory Atcitty Deposition, R.
941, at pages 29-34.
the

impression

Certainly, Mr. Grover did nothing to dispel

that Rory would

be able to speak

allegations at some point down the road.

about the

Indeed, Mr. Grover

testified that he had a policy of not explaining disciplinary
policies and procedures to students until after he had decided what
to do. Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Page 28. Although this
may have been consistent with the policy that matters be addressed
at the time of suspension, the Atcittys were not aware of what was
happening.
If the District claims that these first two encounters were
sufficient to satisfy the notice requirement, defendant should be
estopped from making this argument because what the Mr. Grover
said, and more importantly what he failed to say, were misleading.
cf.

Colorado Water, Etc. v. Town of Frederick, 641 P.2d 958, 964

(Colo. En Banc 1982).
failed

to

provide

disciplinary

It is especially noteworthy that Mr. Grover

Mr. Atcitty

process

despite

with

any

his repeated

explanation
requests

of

the

for this

information. Roger Atcitty Deposition, R. 939, at Page 24.
Notice of the opportunity to be heard is a fundamental aspect
of due process. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895.
In this case no notice was given.

In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,

579, the Court stated that the timing and content of the notice of
the right to be heard depends upon an appropriate accommodation of
the competing interests involved.

Accommodating the interests of

Rory and the District would have been easy to do in this case. Mr.
18

Grover had spoken to the other students during his investigation
and presumably had their allegations when questioning Rory, See
Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Page 23.
have

told

Rory

that

he

was

being

Mr. Grover should

suspended,

identified

and

explained the evidence behind the allegations, and told him that
their meeting on May 14 would be his only opportunity to give his
side of the story.
Rory's due process interest in his education could have been
effectively

balanced

against

the

school

district's

right

to

administer discipline in its schools by simply warning and advising
the

student

that

he

must

respond

approached by the principal, cf.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686

to

the

charges

when

first

Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v.

(1986)

(disciplinary

rule

regarding

offensive speech along with pre-speech admonitions of teachers
provided adequate warning and notice to the student)

(emphasis

added). 8
The Utah Supreme Court followed Goss by holding that notice of
the opportunity to be heard must contain the type of information
that is reasonably calculated to alert one that the matter is
pending and that a particular time is proper to be heard in a
proper manner. Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dept. , 616 P. 2d 598, 601602 (Utah 1980).

To follow Goss, 419 U.S. 565, 581, Mr. Grover

should have announced his decision, explained the basis for his
8

Of course since Mr. Grover was functioning as a police agent
rather than a school administrator, an even more compelling case is
made that the balancing of school and student interests require
that Rory would at the outset receive clear explanations and
warnings by the principal.
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allegations and suspension, and then afford Rory an opportunity to
speak. Mr. Grover's communications with Mr. Atcitty and attempted
questioning of Rory completely fail to comport with this standard.
Mr. Grover said nothing to warn Mr. Atcitty (or Rory) that Rory was
being suspended, why he was being suspended, or that this would be
the only time and place to be heard about the allegations. Indeed,
he only asked questions to obtain
Deposition, R.

941, at Pages

information. Rory Atcitty

29-34.

Mr. Grover's "notice11

therefore clearly had little due process "reality or worth." Id. at
601 & n.7 (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 314-315); see also Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207,
1212 (Utah 1983) (inadequate or ambiguous notice violates due
process); Siblerud v. Colorado State Bd. Of Agriculture, 896
F.Supp. 1506, 1516 (D.Colo. 1995).
(2) There Was No Meaningful Opportunity To Be Heard.
The May 13 encounter with Mr. Atcitty was not an adequate
hearing because Rory was not present.

The District requires that

the student be present during a hearing. School District Policy No.
FHA (4) f R. 340.

Mr. Grover also did not have all of the facts,

and had not provided Mr. Atcitty with what he did know.

No

meaningful exchange occurred between them about the allegations.
And, significantly, Mr. Grover failed to provide Mr. Atcitty with
an explanation of the disciplinary process despite Mr. Atcitty7s
having repeatedly requested this information. Roger Atcitty Sr.
Deposition, R. 939, at Page 24.
The May 14 encounter between Rory and Mr. Grover was not an
20

adequate due process hearing.

Rory would not respond to Mr.

Grovels questions without his father, something that Mr. Grover
was aware of.

This was a reasonable approach for Rory because he

had every expectation that his parents would be present since Mr.
Grover had said nothing to the contrary when Mr. Atcitty told him
that he did not want his son questioned unless he was present.
Moreover, Rory could infer from the circumstances of meeting that
Mr.

Grover

was

simply

making

inquiries,

see

Rory

Atcitty

Deposition, R. 941, at Pages 29-34, and not holding a hearing, a
reasonable assumption since Mr. Grover did not warn him that this
would be his only chance to speak.
Significantly, Mr. Grover did not notify Rory that he had made
up his mind about what action to take or explain the basis for his
action, both prerequisites to triggering the student's obligation
to state his side of the story. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 571 n.
6, 581-582. Indeed, Mr. Grover acknowledged at that point that he
had not decided what to do until two days later (May 16) following
his conversation with the Superintendent of Schools. Mr. Atcitty
went to the school after the principal had attempted to speak with
Rory, but was not told that the investigation was finished, a
decision had been made, or that this was the only time for his son
to give his side of the story.

Mr. Grover's investigation was at

that point still continuing. His inquires could not reasonably be
construed as a hearing because all he wanted to do was ask
questions. See Rory Atcitty Deposition, R. 941, at Pages 29-34.
This was evident because he did not announce a decision, attempt to
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explain the evidence, and did not ask for or obtain Rory's denial,
all required by Goss. Id. at 581.

The lack of clear and definite

notice that a hearing would take place, see Point cf1) f

supra.,

ensured that the May 14 encounters would not have been an adequate
opportunity to prepare and be heard which is essential to any
legitimate due-process hearing.
d. The Last Encounters Between Student, Parent & Principal.
Rory received no advance notice or an opportunity to prepare
for the May 16th meeting at which he was suspended.
was completely
heard.

inadequate

Home-schooling

as a "meaningful
and

other

issues

The encounter

opportunity" to be
in

mitigation

of

punishment, essential to the fair-hearing process, were denied or
not properly addressed.
(1) Notice Was Inadequate.
Neither Rory nor Mr. Atcitty had advance warning of the May 16
meeting.

The student had no opportunity to collect his thoughts

and prepare for the meeting.

It is not surprising that he was

completely unprepared to articulate a defense, other than to make
a simple denial.

This lack of notice and the opportunity

to

properly prepare an adequate response constitutes a violation of
due process. Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1212 (citing Uhler
v. Secretary of Health & Mental Hygiene, 412 A.2d 1287 (Md. 1980)
and Myers v. Moreno, 564 S.W.2d 83 (Mo.App. 1978)). 9
9

The failure of Mr. Grover to verbally provide notice of the
rules and procedures is aggravated by the District's vague and
ambiguous policies. A school district must have policies which are
specific as to disciplinary matters to the extent that students are
provided notice of these procedures. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 53A-1122

Whether timing of the "hearing" in Rory's suspension from
school comports with Due Process must be analyzed according to the
three-part balancing test outlined in Matthews.

Although Rory

asserted that the May 13-16 encounters were not timely and failed
to give him an adequate opportunity to be heard, the trial court
failed to undertake the Matthews analysis on these questions. See
Ruling On Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, R. 804-806 (see
Addendum 4b); Ruling on Plaintiffs Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment, R. 814-816 (see Addendum 4a).

These errors require that

the judgment of the trial court be reversed.
(2) There Was No Meaningful Opportunity To Be Heard.
It is clear that Principal Grover used the meeting with the
police only to announce the students7 suspensions. Lyman Grover
Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 31-33, 35-38, 39. He never asked Rory
to give his side of the story. Id.

The other purpose of the

meeting was to bring the students together so that they could be
interrogated and arrested by the police. Id.

During the officer's

interrogation, Rory did make a brief protestation of innocence. Id.

902; 53A-11-903.
Confusion abounds as to exactly what the
District's policies may have been at the time that Rory was
suspended. There may have been at least five different policies.
Apparently some were obsolete. See Plaintiff's Summary Judgment
Exhibits, R. 234-348, Exhibits l(a)-l(e). Although the extent of
clarity of District policies may be a disputed issue of fact, see
Point Two, supra,
uncertainty as to which rules are applicable or
whether they are clear and specific is a significant factor in
determining whether due process has been violated. Haynes v. Mayor
and Council of Borough Of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976);
Mitchell v. King, 363 A.2d 68, 70-71 (Conn. 1976); McCall v. State.
354 So.2d 869 (Fla. 1978); State v. Martinez, 538 P.2d 521, 524
(Wash. 1975); Bertens v. Stewart, 453 So.2d 92, 93-94 (Fla. App. 2d
Dist. 1984).
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This denial apparently went unacknowledged when Mr. Grover wrote in
the notice of suspension that the student had said nothing about
the allegations. Student Behavior Referral, R. 420. But what little
Rory said pertained to a police, not a school matter, and can
hardly be a satisfactory substitute for the due process right of
the student to have a meaningful opportunity to provide his side of
the story.10
After telling Mr. Atcitty that his son would have the right,
under some circumstances, to confront his accusers, Lyman Grover
Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 17-18, Mr. Grover should have afforded
Rory this opportunity.

Withholding information by refusing to

provide the names of the student-informants, Id. at 16, as well as
concealing the statements provided by the students by giving them
only to the police, Id. at 31-33, effectively denied Rory the right
to confront and challenge the evidence. See, e.g., Lucas v. Murray
City Civil Service Commission, 331 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 20. This act
created the very problem cautioned against in Goss, that there
should be safeguards to avoid "erroneous deprivations." Goss v.
Lopez,

419

U.S.

565,

580;

see

also

American-Arab

Anti-

Discrimination v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1069 (9th Cir. 1995).
In Goss, the Supreme Court held that school suspensions of ten
days or less require a hearing of "at least an informal give-and-

10

The colloquy between the officer and Rory clearly only had
a law enforcement and not an educational purpose. In addition to
questioning the students, the officer used the occasion to lecture
the students about breaking the law. The officer also took all
students into custody and arranged for them to be taken or sent
home.
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take between student and disciplinarian." Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 581-584; see also State Ex Rel. Yarber v. McHenry, 915 S.W.2d
325,

328 (Mo.banc 1995); Board Of Curators, Univ. Of Mo. v.

Horowitz., 435 U.S. 78, 86.

The May 16 confrontation between the

police, Mr. Grover and the students can hardly be viewed as the
give-and-take atmosphere contemplated by the Supreme in Goss.
Rory was also not afforded a meaningful opportunity to be
heard on all matters in mitigation of punishment, regardless of
whether he was guilty of misconduct. Strickland v. Inlow, 519 F.2d
744, 746-747 (8th Cir. 1975); Lamb v. Panhandle Community Unit
School Dist. No. 2, 826 F.2d 526, 528-529 (7th Cir. 1987);

cf.

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 488 (parolee found in
violation of parole conditions has right to argue against parole
revocation).

The District's policies likewise grant a student the

right to be heard as to punishment, School Policy No. FHAf4^r R.
340, although the drug policy and the Whitehorse High School policy
are silent on this point. See School District Policy No. FGAB, R.
656-665; Whitehorse High School 1995-1996 Student/Parent Handbook,
Discipline, R. 648-650.
Rory's first encounter with the principal involved only Mr.
Grover's inquiry into whether misconduct had occurred, Lyman Grover
Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 23-27, and not as to punishment, Id.,
at Page 25 (Mr. Grover states that he had not decided what action
to take at time of first encounter).

However, Mr. Grover did

refuse to ameliorate Rory's situation in any way when he informed
the student's father early on in the week that he, the principal,
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would countenance no deals. Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at
Page

17.

This

hard-line

position, taken

when

the

student's

culpability was still very much unresolved, and several days before
the principal formally made up his mind as to what action to take,
demonstrates

that

Rory

was

not

given

an

adequate

chance

to

ameliorate his punishment.
In the second encounter involving the police officer, Mr.
Grover provided Mr. Atcitty with no opportunity to present matters
in mitigation. Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 35-37.
Mr. Grover admitted he did not talk to the students about postsuspension services, including home-schooling. Id. at 36. Nor did
Mr. Grover broach this subject when talking with Mr. Atcitty later
in the day when he came in to pick up Rory. Id. at 40-43.1X This
violated due process. See also Point 2b(l),

infra.

(3) Failure To Provide Home-Schooling Services
Tainted the Hearing Process.
Part of the suspension-hearing process is the provision of
home-schooling services to the student.

These are required by the

District's disciplinary procedures,12 and Utah state law, Utah Code
Ann. §§ 53A-11-906-907.

The student may elect to fulfill the ten-

11

The principal's failure to speak with the father about this
subject is consistent with Mr. Grover7s earlier hard-line attitude,
forthrightly communicated to Mr. Atcitty several days earlier, that
he would no consider no deals. Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at
Page 17.
A fair inference is that the principal's no-dealsposition certainly slammed the door on any action which would have
ameliorated Rory's punishment.
12

E.g., School District Policy No. 7335(3), R. 238; School
District Policy No. FFr3), R. 252; School District Policy No.
F G A B f A H l U a ) , R. 255.
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day

suspension

obligation

by

either

entering

an

alcohol

rehabilitation program or by receiving home-schooling services. San
Juan School District Policy No. F G A B f A H D a - b , R. 255.

Despite

these requirements, Mr. Grover admitted that he did not discuss
these or other post-suspension procedures or services when meeting
with the students on May 16. Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at
Page 36.
Rory chose home-schooling services.

These services were not

adequately provided to Rory because the school had no such program
in place. Roger Atcitty Sr. Depositionf R. 939, at Pages 13-18.
Indeed, Rory had to wait out the first six days of his suspension
before he was provided with such services. Id. at 16-17.

In order

to get these services, Rory's parents had to force the issue. Id.
at 13-17.
District's

Since home-schooling services are part in parcel of the
due

process

hearing

procedure, the

failure

of

the

District to adhere to its own policy on this matter constitutes a
due process violation. See Galveston Independent School Pis, v.
Booths, 590 S.W.2d 553, 555-557 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (failure of
District to follow its own rules is a factor in determining whether
there is a due process violation); cf.

Lucas v. Murray City Civil

Service Commission, 331 Utah. Adv. Rep. 15, 18-19.13
13

The significance of this point as a due process issue is
underscored by the fact that none of the other suspended students
were provided with alternate education services. When asked why,
the principal responded by saying that other parents did not ask
for it. Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 44-55.
The
District apparently employed a practice in this case which was
inconsistent with its own procedures when it failed to have
available an established home-services program, a shortcoming
which, significantly, violated state requirements. Utah Code Ann.
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e. The "Impartial" Disciplinarian.
Although it may be disputed that Mr. Grover was an impartial
disciplinarian, see Point 2b(2), infra,

a fair reading of the facts

most favorable to Rory demonstrates that he was not impartial. The
trial court at first refused to decide this issue because it was
not raised

in plaintiff's

original

complaint.

See Ruling

Plaintiff's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment, R. 814-815.

On
The

trial court, however, went on to decide the question on the merits.
Id., at R. 815. Accepting and then disposing of plaintiff's claim
in this fashion makes the issue amenable to appellate review.14
An impartial disciplinarian is an essential component of the
fair-hearing required by due process. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc.,
446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980).

The test is not whether the principal

was impartial in fact but whether the average person would question
his impartiality. United States v. Gigax, 605 F.2d 507, 511 (10th
Cir. 1979).

A reasonable person would question Principal Grover's

impartiality.
Mr. Grover performed in two capacities while suspending Rory
from school.

First, he acted as a school official administering

school discipline and school policy.
of

the

police.

He

became

a

Second, he acted as an agent

police

agent

when

he

gathered

information for law enforcement. Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940,

§ 53A-11-906; see also Synder v. Farnsworth, 896 F.Supp. 96, 99
(N.D.N.Y. 1995).
14

If this Court accepts Rory's argument that he was entitled
to file and proceed on his amended complaint, then review of this
issue can proceed on this basis as well.
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at Pages 37, 53-54.

He continued in this role by submitting

reports of student interviews and summaries of his investigation to
law enforcement and by compelling Rory and the other students to
gather so that a police officer could interrogate and arrest them.
Id. , at Pages 31-33, 35-38, 39. He was abrupt with the students at
the time he suspended them, did not encourage Rory or the others to
respond to him, and merely presented them with a fait

accompli

in

terms of punishment. See, e.g., Id. at Pages 32-37. While this may
be consistent with the role of a police officer who can be more
judgmental while investigating a crime, it is entirely inconsistent
with a school administrator's obligation to act fairly toward his
students.

Goss

v.

Lopez,

419 U.S.

565, 583-584; University

Disciplinary Process, 1987 Yale Law Journal, Vol. 96, Pages 2132,
2140-2150.
Mr. Grover's dual role is constitutionally suspect because
when he became involved

in a law enforcement matter he was

subjected to a higher standard of constitutional conduct than he
would have been if he had not assisted the police but merely acted
in an educational capacity. See of., New Jersey v. T.L.O. , 469 U.S.
325 (1985) (school officials are state actors and subject to
constitutional restrictions when conducting themselves in matters
that are quasi-criminal in nature).
absolute

right

to

disqualify

a

Although there may be no

principal

who

is

both

an

investigator and an adjudicator, see, e.g., Brewer By Dreyfus v.
Austin Independent Sch. Dist., 779 F.2d 260, 264 (5th Cir. 1985),
the extent of Mr. Grover's involvement with the police created a
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bias which deprived Rory of fundamental fairness in the suspension
process. See Id. (citing and quoting Sullivan v. Houston Indep.
School Dist. . 475 F.2d 1071, 1077 (5th Cir.), cert,

denied,,

414

U.S. 1032 (1973)) (facts occasionally may demonstrate that a school
official's involvement in an incident created a bias precluding his
affording a student an impartial hearing); see also Staton v.
Mayes , 552 F.2d 908, 913-915 (10th Cir. 1977).
There

is

a

particular

need

for

heightened

due-process

protection when the police are involved in a significant way.15
This is evident in Rory's situation because the police officer was
given the fruits of Principal Grover's investigation.

The officer

was also provided with the best possible opportunity and conditions
to interrogate and then arrest the students.

This involvement is

certainly "significant." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
487 (1971) (resolution of whether a person becomes an agent of the
police is determined by the totality of the circumstances); see
also

Annotation,

Admissibility

in

Criminal

Case

of

Evidence

Obtained by Search by Private Individual, 36 A.L.R.3d 553, 567-571
(1971, 1987 & 1997 Supp.); W.LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 1.8(d)
(3d ed. 1996).

The mixing of police and educator roles placed Rory

in a tenuous position.

He was faced with a Hobson/s choice.

He

could remain silent and risk the loss of his valuable property

15

Veronia School District 47J v. Acton, 115 S.Ct 2386, 2393,
2396-2397 (1995); People v. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d 310, 326 (111.
1996); M. v. Board of Education, 429 F.Supp. 288, 292 (S.D. 111.
1977); M.J, v. State, 399 So.2d 996, 998 (Fla. App. 1981); State v.
Young, 216 S.E.2d 586 (Ga. 1975); Commonwealth v. Cass, 446
Pa.Super 66 (1995).
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interest in a public education or he could defend himself and
expose himself to an unwarranted prosecution. See University
Disciplinary Process, 1987 Yale Law Journal, Vol. 96, Pages 2152,
2140-2154.

When Mr. Grover deliberately forced Rory into this

dilemma, the rules of fundamental fairness and due process were
violated.
In its ruling, however, the trial court failed to address the
principal's law enforcement role as it may have affected Mr.
Grover7s impartiality. Rather, the Court mistakenly identified and
then limited its decision to the question of whether a school
administrator can be both an investigator and a disciplinarian.
Ruling On Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment, R. 815
(see Addendum 4a).

Such dual roles are usually, but not always,

resolved in favor of the disciplinarian. Brewer By Dreyfus v.
Austin Independent Sch. Dist., 779 F.2d 260, 264.

However, the

addition of the law enforcement role to the principal's agenda for
Rory's disciplinary process provides a more compelling argument
that Mr. Grover was not impartial• Since the trial court's ruling
is in error, this Court should reverse and set aside the summary
judgment ruling.
f. Rory Atcitty Was Entitled To Enhanced Due Process.
Mr. Grover should have made the focus of the alleged incident
an educational matter rather than using it as a vehicle to gather
criminal evidence to arrest and prosecute the students.

Because

Mr. Grover moved from an educational to a law enforcement focus,
Rory was entitled to enhanced due process procedures. There was a
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clear law enforcement emphasis and orientation to Mr. Grover's
investigation.

This was also abundantly clear when Mr. Grover

assisted the police in interrogating and arresting Rory and the
other students.

Confusing law enforcement and education roles

created a problem that was compounded by Mr. Grover's failure to be
open and forthcoming about what was happening, what the process of
the right to be heard really was, and when critical matters,
including hearings, would occur.
Enhanced

due

process

was

clearly

circumstances of Rory's suspension.

necessary

under

the

In Goss v. Lopezf 419 U.S.

565, 584, the Court said "[n]or do we put aside the possibility
that

in unusual

situations, although

involving only

a short

suspension, something more than the rudimentary procedures will be
required." One such "unusual situation" should be a case where the
investigation of a crime intermixes with and dominates over the
administration of education.

This is especially important where

the Districts policy provides no guidance as to how or when law
enforcement should be involved or how law enforcement involvement
should

inter relate with the suspension process. See School

PoliciesP R. 415-416, 418, 236. In Gabrilowitz v. Newmon. 582 F.2d
100, 107 (1st Cir. 1978), the court ruled that a school's failure
to allow enhanced protection in its disciplinary procedures (i.e.,
the right of the student to an attorney) where related criminal
proceedings were pending was a violation of due process.16
16

Using enhanced due process procedures would also have been
consistent with the principal's view that the law enforcement
aspect of the case necessarily restricted his authority as an
32

Enhanced due process, with clear, timely and adequate notice
of the evidence and the opportunity to be heard, a more formal
hearing involving the presence of parents, and the confrontation of
witnesses who supplied inculpatory information against Rory, should
have occurred.

In short, the provision of a meaningful opportunity

to sort through the facts and to be heard, would have complied with
Goss and the balancing-of-interests

requirement of Matthews v.

Eldridae. 424 U.S. 319, 335.
The trial court should have weighed and balanced the competing
public and private interests at stake in this case. Matthews v.
Eldridae, 424 U.S. 319, 335; Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579; see
also Prebble v. Broderick, 535 F.2d 605, 616 (10th Cir. 1976);
Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service Commission, 331 Utah Adv. Rep.
15, 18.

The trial court made no such analysis when ruling that

defendants were entitled to summary judgment. Ruling On Defendants7
Motion For Summary Judgment, R. 804-806 (see Addendum 4b).
denying

plaintiff7s

concluded

that

no

summary
enhanced

judgment
due

motion,

process

was

the

trial

due.

In

court

Ruling

On

Plaintiff7s Motion For Partial Summary Judgment, R. 814-816 (see
Addendum

4a).

In so ruling, the Court did not undertake the

Matthews-Goss analysis, and simply concluded that only the informal
give-and-take between student and disciplinarian was due and had
been provided. R. 816.

The trial court's failure to weigh and

balance Rory's interests with those of the school district is a
fundamental

flaw in reasoning, requiring that the

judgment be

educator. See Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 13-14.
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reversed. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335; Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565, 579-580.

A proper Matthews-Goss balancing analysis

would have considered the following matters:
First, in evaluating the private interests at stake, the right
to an education is very valuable in the constitutional sense. See
Point lb, supra.

The allegations were serious and affected Rory's

record of his position as a honor society student and student-body
officer. McGhee v. Draper, 564 F.2d 902, 911-912 (10th Cir. 1977);
Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F.Supp. 777, 796-797

(W.D. Mich. 1975).

Added procedural safeguards were necessary because Rory received
additional penalties beyond suspension, including his exclusion
from an honors society dinner and other end-of-the year activities.
Jones v. Latexo Independent School Dist., 499 F.Supp. 223, 239 n.15
(E.D. Texas 1980); see also Conrad v. University of Washington, 814
P.2d 1242, 1246-1247 (Wash.App. 1991).
Second, the extent to which factual issues are in dispute must
be taken into account in determining whether enhanced due process
is necessary. McGhee v. Draper, 564 F.2d 902, 912 (ruling that one
factor requiring certain elements of due process is where "disputed
facts turned

largely

on the word

of

individuals").

Although

allowing Rory to confront his accusers after receiving a full
explanation of the evidence may have reduced the potential for
mistakes or misunderstandings, Mr. Grover refused to tell Mr.
Atcitty the names of the children involved and also withheld other
pertinent details of the alleged misconduct, including statements
of the other students. See Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at
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Pages 15-16, 31-33.

This circumstance constitutes a due process

violation because the District, by virtue of Mr. Grover's assuming
a law enforcement function, became obligated to use an enhanced,
more particularized, and more reliable fact-finding procedure than
what he used.
Third, in considering the governmental interest involved, the
right

of

the

school

district

to

effectively

administer

its

disciplinary policies in the course of operating its schools, the
trial court should have taken into account the minimal burden
additional

due process

protection

finances or administration.
protection

other

than

would

have

had

on

District

No showing was made that due process

something

minimal

in nature would

have

adversely burdened the District or posed a threat to its obligation
to maintain order in its schools. Indeed, a proper exchange of
information about the allegations and affording Rory a meaningful
opportunity to be heard would not have been time consuming and
would not have created any burden at all. Such a process would have
facilitated the District's interests in keeping its students in
school, a consideration

acknowledged

by in its policies

(e.g.

School District Policy No. 7320(2), R. 235 & School District Policy
No. 7332fl)r R. 236), and by Goss, where the Court said: "[i]t
deserves [the student's] interest and the interest of the State if
his suspension is in fact unwarranted.11 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 579.
Rory should have been asked to and provided with a meaningful
opportunity to state his side of the case after being given a full
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explanation of the alleged facts and been allowed to confront those
who made statements against him. This would have been possible if
the police officer had not dominated the May 16 meeting.
Rory had an interest in having his parents present as well as
being heard. District Policy requires that a parent be given an
opportunity to review a suspension. School District Policy No.
FHA14J_, R. 340; see also of.

United States v. Watts, 513 F.2d 5, 8

(10th Cir. 1975). The parents7 presence was necessary because the
investigation, the early encounters with the principal, parent and
student, and then the May 16 meeting, in combination, made the
suspension process so adversarial. The parents7 presence was also
necessary because, as Mr. Grover testified, see Lyman Grover
Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 13-14, parents must be involved when
students commit crimes.
Rory therefore had a due process interest in his parents7
right to protect their child7s education. This interest arises as
a matter of constitutional law, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534-535 (1923); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400

(1923);

Sullivan v. Houston Independent

School District, 307

F.Supp. 1328, 1343 (S.D. Texas 1969), and as a matter of Utah law.
See Utah Code Ann. § 53A-ll-905( 4)-( 5) ; Utah Code Ann. § 53A-11906.

Certainly, it is a fair inference from the facts that Rory

had a reasonable expectation that his father would again be called
in about the matter since Mr. Grover made an deliberate, indeed,
conscientious effort earlier in the week to do so and had said
nothing to the contrary when Mr. Atcitty told him not to question
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his son unless he was present. Mr. Grover involved the parents at
the beginning and at the end of the process, but would not bring
them in on the two critical occasions when Rory was alone and
confronting the principal and the police.

This aspect of Rory's

suspension process is surely constitutionally suspect.
Rory had the right to have his attorney present, particularly
in a

situation

having

such

serious

criminal

overtones. See

Gabrilowitz v. Newmon, 582 F.2d 100, 107. His father had told Mr.
Grover

that

Rory

was

represented

by

counsel.

Lyman

Grover

Deposition,, R. 940, at Page 20. As a result, Mr. Grover called the
District's superintendent. Id. at 20.

Mr. Grover, however, went

ahead with the May 16th meeting and suspended Rory without allowing
the student's attorney to be present.

Mr. Grover's failure to

afford Rory the right to counsel was a deliberate move to avoid
having to undergo an attorney's scrutiny. An attorney should have
been present because Mr. Grover was acting in a law enforcement
role and assisting the police.

Mr. Grover's apparent bias is

another reason why an attorney should have been present. See Point
le,

supra.
In Goss, the Supreme Court said that it would not require that

a student be afforded the opportunity to secure counsel. Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583.

But Goss also held that in "unusual

situations" more than rudimentary process will be required. IdL at
584. The circumstances of Rory's suspension demonstrates that this
is one such situation.
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POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
DEFENDANTS A SUMMARY JUDGMENT•
a.

DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT
AS A MATTER OF LAW

Neither Rory nor Mr. Atcitty were given adequate notice of the
"hearings

or

the

procedures

that

were

involved

with

the

investigation and suspension process. See Points l e d ) & ld(l),
supra.

Rory was not given the right to defend himself at a hearing

at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. See Points lc(2)
& ld(2), supra.

Other rights pertinent to a proper hearing were

ignored or diminished. See Points ld(3) & le, supra.

Rory should

have but was not afforded enhanced due process procedures. See
Point lff supra.

The trial court's ruling that Defendants were

entitled to summary judgment is, therefore, in error.

Defendants

were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the facts,
taken in a light most favorable to Rory, demonstrate that Rory was
denied, not provided, basic due process.
b.

THERE ARE DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT

Summary judgment is only appropriate if there are no disputed
issues of material fact.

Rule 56(c); K & T Inc. v. Koroulis, 888

P.2d 623, 627. This Court determines only whether the trial court
correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material fact.
Id.

This Court should view all facts and reasonable inferences

drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to Mr. Atcitty. Higgins
v. Salt Lake County, 855 P. 2d 231, 233.

Although Plaintiff and

Defendants sought summary judgment, alleging that there were no

23.

disputed issues of material fact, it became apparent as the record
was developed during the motion process that there were indeed
disputed factual issues as to some issues.
(1) The student's right to be heard in mitigation of
punishment involves disputed issues of fact.
During the May 16th meeting in which Rory was suspended and
arrested, he was not provided an opportunity to speak about matters
which might have mitigated the punishment he received. Lyman Grover
Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 35-37. See also Point ld(2)f

supra.17

There were issues that could have and should have been discussed in
mitigation of the punishment.18

Discussing these matters would

have been consistent with the District's policy of keeping children
in school, e.g, School District Policy No. 7370, R. 245-246, and
would certainly have been required as a proper aspect of due
process.

It is anticipated that the District will argue that Rory

was free to state his side of the story or to discuss anything
else, including mitigation of punishment, at the May 16th meeting
with the police.

The record, however, is clear that Mr. Grover7s

purpose for the meeting, and the only thing accomplished there, was
17

There was no earlier opportunity to be heard because the
principal had not decided what action to take. Lyman Grover
Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 28, 18-19.
18

There was the right to choose home-schooling, drug
rehabilitation or a school re-entry program. District Policy No.
FGAB, R. 657-658; there was the right to avoid additional
penalties, a particularly significant aspect of the hearing process
because the principal had the right to recommend additional
suspension time. District Policy No. FHA3, R. 440; or Rory may have
simply wanted to discuss with the principal the process for
clearing his record at some future time so that the incident would
not affect his status as a student body officer or position as an
honors society member.
19

the announcement that the students were suspended.

While the

meeting certainly assisted the police in interrogating and then
arresting Rory and the others, no room was made available for Rory
to discuss his punishment with the principal.
Following his suspension from school and arrest by the police,
Rory was allowed to remain on school premises while his father was
called to the school.

Mr. Atcitty went to the school and had a

brief conversation with the principal. He was provided with a
accompli

fait

in that he was given a form with the suspension decision

and punishment already marked in, Plaintiffs7 Summary Judgment
Exhibit 6, Student Behavior Referral, R. 419, was not told that, at
least, some matters relating to mitigation of punishment could
remain open for further discussion and decision, Roger Atcitty Sr.
Deposition, R. 939, at Pages 11-12; Fn.18., supra,

and simply chose

to leave in the face of Mr. Grover's "take or leave it" attitude.19
The District's version of what happened at this last "meeting"
is substantially different. The principal claims that Mr. Atcitty
came and went quickly, Lyman Grover Depositionf R. 940, at Pages
40-42, that the father acted brusquely and refused to talk about
anything, Id.; see also Lyman Grover Affidavit, R. 517-518, f 13,
and, apparently contradicting himself, later said that Mr. Atcitty
did not talk with him about anything of substance other than drug

19

Mr. Grover had assumed the same attitude from the very
beginning when he told Mr. Atcitty earlier in the week that he
would make no accommodation concerning Rory's situation. Lyman
Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Page 17.
There was certainly
sufficient time to tell Mr. Atcitty that there were matters in
mitigation and to discuss them if the principal chose to do so.

M

rehabilitation. See Id.20

Significantly, even the District's

version of the facts reveal that the principal did not inform
either Rory or Mr. Atcitty that Rory had the right to be heard in
mitigation of punishment or even what matters were apparently open
for discussion.21 And significantly, Mr. Grover did admit that
during the May 16 meeting he did not tell the students about any
post-suspension

services

or

home-schooling.

Lyman

Grover

Depositionr R. 940, at Page 36.
The trial court itself found there to be disputed issues of
fact after considering Plaintiff's summary judgment argument about
the question of mitigation of punishment. See Ruling On Plaintiff's
Motion For Partial Summary Judgmentf R. 815-816.22

In opposing

Defendants' proposed summary judgment order, Plaintiff brought the
effect of the Court's ruling (that there apparently was a need to

20

Mr. Grover acknowledged that the school had no such program,
but referred students to Social Services. However, he made no
mention of any of this to Mr. Atcitty or to Rory. See Id. at Pages
41-43.
21

Although District policy provides that the suspension notice
should include the date, time and place for the parent to meet, with
the principal to discuss the suspension, see Policy No. FHA4fd l , R.
340, Mr. Grover did not inform Mr. Atcitty of these matters. See
Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 40-43. The form did not
contain this information. In his affidavit, Mr. Grover says that
he tried to talk about the term of suspension, but said nothing
about other important matters. See Lyman Grover Affidavit, R. 518.
The form notice is also silent about any such other matters. See R.
420.
22 iirphe court also finds that in the context of Plaintiff's
Motion For Partial Summary Judgment there is a genuine issue of
material fact which precludes summary judgment in favor of
Plaintiff on the issue of whether Plaintiff was given an
opportunity to be heard with regard to the alleged conduct of the
Plaintiff and in mitigation of punishment." See Addendum 4a.
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try this disputed factual issue) to the Court's attention. R. 867869.

The trial court, however, ignored this incongruity when it

overruled the objection, R. 880-883, 897-902, and when it proceeded
to sign the proposed judgment. R. 884-896.

Nevertheless, there

remains disputed factual issues as to whether Rory was properly
afforded his right to mitigate the punishment that he received.
(2) Whether the principal was an impartial disciplinarian
is a disputed issue of fact.
There is no doubt that Mr. Grover considered Rory's discipline
to be a police matter, Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Pages
37, 53-54, as did the Plaintiffs. Roger Atcitty Sr. Deposition, R.
939, at Pages 709. Mr. Grover collected evidence with the goal of
providing it to law enforcement, Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940,
at Pages 37, 53-54, and provided important assistance to the police
by compelling the students to go to his office where they could be
interrogated and arrested. Id. at 31-33, 35-38, 39.

The clear

meaning of Mr. Grover's conduct is that he was functioning as a
police agent and that the administration of school policy and
discipline was merely incidental to that role.

Mr. Grover7s

voluntary assumption of a law enforcement role contrasts with the
District's

view

that

the

principal

was

simply

an

educator

disciplining a student, that his not calling the police until the
end of his investigation demonstrates he was not a police agent,
and that he did nothing more than call in the police as required by
school policy.

The resolution of this issue required the trial

court to defer fact finding until trial.
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(3) Whether the student was provided notice of
the rules and procedures and time and place of hearing
involve disputed issues of fact.
The District was obligated to provide adequate notice of the
rules of conduct and the procedures involved in the disciplinary
process. Utah Code Ann. § 53A-ll-903(2); see also School District
Policy No. FHAf R. 334. Whether Mr. Atcitty was provided adequate
notice of the rules involves disputed issues of fact. Mr. Atcitty
repeatedly asked for a hearing and an explanation of the process
involved, which was never provided. Roger Atcitty Sr. Deposition,
R. 939, at Pages 24, 26. Mr. Grover admitted he does not discuss
suspension procedures until a decision has been made. Lyman Grover
Depositionf R. 940, at Page 28. Mr. Grover never did provide Rory
or his father with this information.

In contrast, the District

claimed that the principal tried several different times to explain
board

procedure

and

Opposition, R. 587.23

policies. See

Defendants'

Memorandum

In

Although this differing view of the facts

may be resolved in Plaintiff7s favor when considering whether
summary

judgment for the Defendants was appropriate, it does

demonstrate that a factual dispute exists on this question.
(4) The Lyman Grover Affidavit.
In an attempt to bolster Defendants' claim to summary judgment
and to frustrate Plaintiff's Motion, Mr. Grover submitted an
affidavit. See Lyman Grover Affidavit, R. 513-519. This affidavit
23

The District referenced Mr. Grover's affidavit, R. 513-519,
at f 13; Mr. Grover's deposition, R. 940, at Pages 12-13, 15-16,
23-25, 39-42; Mr. Atcitty's deposition, R. 939, at Pages 4-12; and
Rory's Deposition, R. 941, at Pages 25-27, 29-32.
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contradicted his sworn deposition testimony. In regards to the May
16th meeting between Mr. Atcitty and Mr. Grover, he describes in
his deposition testimony that a conversation occurred between them.
See Lyman Grover Deposition, R. 940, at Pages 40-42. In his
affidavit, he makes the flat assertion that Roger Atcitty ". . .
refused to speak with me." Lyman Grover Affidavit, R. 517-518. If
the trial court had accepted this latter statement as an absolute
fact, this undoubtedly affected Rory's contention that he, through
his parent, was not afforded an adeguate and timely opportunity to
be heard in regards to the suspension.

In regards to the police

involvement, Mr. Grover's deposition testimony clearly reveals that
he was engaged in a law enforcement activity at the outset (May
14).

At that time, he interviewed students and drafted a report

for the police.

This stands in sharp contrast with his affidavit

testimony wherein he states that the incident did not become a
police matter until after the suspension process had concluded. Id.
at R. 515-516.24

Clearly, the affidavit statements were designed

to assist Defendants more than does the deposition testimony.
The trial court denied Plaintiff's motion to strike the
affidavit. R. 884-892. This was an improper exercise of the trial
court's discretion.

The affidavit violated

24

summary

judgment

It also contrasts with what actually happened when the
students were suspended on May 16. It is clear that as a part of
the suspension process Mr. Grover summoned all students to his
office and announced his decision. At the same time, the meeting
served the purpose of allowing the officer to review Mr. Grover's
earlier report and the statements of the children, served the
purpose of allowing the officer to interrogate the children, and
enabled the officer to arrest them.
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standards because Mr. Grover did not allege facts showing a
substantial likelihood that his deposition testimony was in error,
nor did he allege an adequate explanation for the contradictory
statements. Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1173; Gaw v. State, 798
P. 2d 1130, 1140-1141.

The net effect of this ruling was self-

defeating because it created factual disputes making the trial
court's granting of summary judgment improper.
POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE
TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT
The parties concluded discovery at the end of December, 1996
and a trial was set for May 28-29, 1997. Plaintiff filed a Motion
for Leave to File an Amended Complaint.

The Amended Complaint

presented no new causes of action, but did provide specific
allegations describing the due process claim. The proposed Amended
Complaint set forth facts which were then apparent as a result of
discovery. The Amended Complaint also clarified the remedy sought
by Plaintiff in this action. Plaintiff requested the amendment to
his complaint on March 6, 1997.
prohibited an amendment.

No pretrial or other order

No pretrial or other order limited the

nature of the issues, or the claims, in the case. The trial court
denied Rory the right to file an amended complaint. R. 895-896. The
trial court also would not consider matters raised in the proposed
amended complaint for purposes of the pending summary judgment
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motions.25
Rule 15

(a), Ut. R. Civ. P., allows a party to amend a

complaint with approval of the Court.

One common reason to amend

a complaint is to bring Plaintiff's allegations as refined by the
discovery process into line with the evidence which will be before
the Court at trial. See Rule 15 (b) . The rule is liberally applied,
and

the

trial

court

therefore

has

considerable

discretion

in

granting a request to amend. Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P. 2d 86, 91
(Utah 1963); Timm v. Dewsnupr 851 P.2d 1178; see also Thompson v.
Superior Fireplace Co., 931 F.2d 372, 374 (6th Cir. 1991); Cooper
v. Shumwav, 780 F.2d 27, 29 (10th Cir. 1985).

Requests to amend

which simply refine a parties7 claim and specify the issues as they
are apparent following discovery are usually granted.

Indeed,

complaints are routinely amended even after trial to conform to the
evidence. See Rule 15(b). 26
Although the District objected to the proposed amendment on
the basis that it added new claims, no new claims were in fact
raised.

The facts only revolved around due process issues arising

from

Rory's

a

suspension

from

school.

Plaintiff's

complaint asserted a due process claim in general terms.

initial
Since

25

The issues which were omitted from the Court's consideration
were (1) Board policies were vague and ambiguous, (2) Mr. Lyman was
not impartial, and (3) Rory was deprived of a liberty interest. See
Ruling On Plaintiff's Motion For Partial Summary Judgmentr R. 814815.
26

The case evidently relied upon by the trial court, Swift
Stop. Inc. v. Wight, 845 P.2d 250 (Utah App. 1992) is not
applicable because the parties in Swift were attempting to add new
claims 18 months after the filing of the initial complaint, Id. at
253-254.
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there is only a basic notice-pleading requirement in Section 1983
cases, Leatherman v. Tarrant County, 113 S.Ct. 1160 (1993), Rory
was entitled to raise any and all factual issues which bear on the
due process claim.
The question posed by the involvement of law enforcement in
the suspension process and the involvement of the principal with
law enforcement pertains to the issue of whether Rory was provided
an adequate opportunity to be heard.

The question of whether the

student had an adequate and timely opportunity to tell his side of
the story is not a new claim, but was raised in the original
complaint.

A prerequisite to the opportunity to be heard is the

question of adequate notice, also nothing new. The law enforcement
issues apply to the question of whether the disciplinarian was
impartial and whether basic due process protection should have been
enhanced.

No new claims are added to this case by simply

describing different aspects of the same matter in an amended
complaint.

The question of the vagueness of District suspension

policies and procedures is likewise not a new claim.

It pertains

to the question of whether Rory had notice of his rights and
responsibilities as Mr. Grover's investigation and suspension
process went forward over a week's time.

His uncertainty and the

uncertainty of Mr. Atcitty as to the rules and as to how they
should deal with the principal prevented Rory from telling his side
of the story until it was too late to do so in a meaningful manner.
See Point 1,

supra.

The Defendants cannot claim they were surprised and unprepared
47

as a result of the proposed amendments.

The issues raised in the

proposed amended complaint were apparent from the allegations made
in the initial complaint.

The issues are also apparent from the

depositions

discovery

taken

during

long

before

the

proposed

amendments, particularly the deposition of Mr. Grover.
There
complaint.

are

many

valid

reasons

See Wright, Miller

why

parties

& Kane, Federal

amend

their

Practice

and

Procedure, Civil 2d, § 1471 (construing the federal rule identical
to Utah's).

These purposes were reflected in Plaintiff's proposed

Amended Complaint.

An amendment under Rule 15(a) is appropriate

when a plaintiff seeks a different remedy. U.S. v. Hougham, 364
U.S. 310 (1960).

An amendment is appropriate to modify previously

alleged claims. Young v. Seabord Corp., 360 F.Supp. 490, 497 (D.
Utah 1973). An amended complaint may also state additional claims.
Freeman v. Bee Mach. Co., 319 U.S. 448 (1943); Pol in v. Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc., 511 F.2d 875, 877 (10th Cir. 1975).

Plaintiff's

proposed complaint satisfies the standards of the rule.
There was not an unreasonable delay in the filing of the
motion.
discovery

The amendment simply reflects the facts developed in
which

had

been

completed

in

late

December, 1996.

Defendants have not been prejudiced since the issues raised in the
amended complaint were apparent from the discovery, particularly
from the deposition testimony.
The trial court's refusal to allow the amended complaint
prevent important issues from being considered in the summary
judgment process.

Prohibition of the amendment also improperly
48

restricted the scope of Rory's due process claim.

Since an

amendment should "...be freely given when justice so requires",
Rule 15(a), the trial court's refusal to allow what should have
been a routine amendment constitutes an abuse of discretion•
CONCLUSION
The Court should reverse the judgment and order of the trial
court.

The Court should order the trial court to enter a partial

judgment for Rory on his claim that he was suspended from school
without due process, reserving the question of remedy for trial.
In the alternative, this Court should remand the case for trial
proceedings

and

allow

plaintiff

to

proceed

on

his

amended

complaint.

Eric P. Swenson
Rosalie Reilly
Attorneys for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Eric P. Swenson, attorney for Appellant, hereby certifies that
he did personally deliver two true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief to the attorneys for Appellees at the law offices
of Anderson

and Anderson, L. Robert Anderson

and

Daniel G.

Anderson, Monticello, Utah, this 16th day of March, 1998.

Eric P. Swenson
Attorney for Appellant
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AMENDMENTS

Amend. XIV, § 3

AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1 ICitizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection |
2. (Representatives — Povvei to ieduce appomtment |
3. |Disqualification to hold office I

Section
4 | Public debt not (o be questioned — Debts of
tbe Confederacy and claims not
to be paid ]
5 (Pouei to enforce amendment.]

Section 1. ICitizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce
ment.]

appoint-

Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.
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Amend

XIV, § 4 CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incuired for payment of pensions and bounties for sei vices in
suppressing msunection oi rebellion, shall not be questioned But neither the
United States noi any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation inclined m aid of msunection or rebellion against the United States, or any
claim for the loss 01 emancipation of an\ slave, but all such debts, obligations,
and claims shall be held illegal and void

Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article
History: Proposed b\ Congiess on June 16
1866 declared to have been ratified b> three
fourths of all the states on July 28 1868

AMENDMENT XV
Section
1 [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not
to disqualify 1

Section
2 IPower to enforce amendment ]

Section 1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not to
disqualify.]
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of seivitude

Sec. 2. [Power to enforce a m e n d m e n t ]
The Congiess shall have power to enfoice this aiticle by appropriate legislation
History: Proposed b\ Congiess on tebiuan
27, 1869, declared to have been ratified b>

more than three fourths of all the states on
March 30, 1870

AMENDMENT XVI
[Income tax.]
The Congiess shall have powei to lav and collect taxes on incomes, from
whatever source denved, without apportionment among the several States,
and without legaid to any census or enumeration
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involved in Gwin, White & Prince, Inc v Hennejord, 305
U S 434 (1939) The taxpayer was a Washington corporation doing business there and shipping fruit from
Washington to places of sale in the various States and
m foreign countries The Court held the tax as applied,
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause
"Here the tax measured by the entire volume of
the interstate commerce in which appellant participates is not apportioned to its activities within
the state If Washington is free to exact such a
tax, other states to which the commerce extends
may ^ i t h equal right lay a tax similarly measured
for the privilege of conducting within their respective territorial limits the activities there which contribute to the service
The present tax though
nominally local thus m its practical operation discriminates against interstate commerce, since it
imposes upon it merelv because interstate commerce
is being done the risk of a multiple burden to which
local commerce is not exposed ' Id , at 439
In the instant case as in Ficklen \ Shelby County
Taxing District 145 IT S 1 (1892)," the tax is on the
gross receipt* from sales made to a local consumer, v hich
may have some impact on commerce Yet as we said m
Gwin White & Prince, supra at 440, in describing the tax
in Ficklen it is "apportioned exactly to the activities
taxed " all of \\hich are intrastate

Affirmed
2
In that case the taxpayers did business as brokers in Tennessee
The-\ solicited local customers and sent their orders to out-of-state
\endors who shipped directl) to the purchaser Tennessee le\ied a
tax on their gross commissions The Court in distinguishing the
drummer' cases illustrated b> Robbins \ Shelby County Taxing District 120 tJ S 489 (1887) stated tint in Ficklen Tennessee did not
t i \ more than it* own internal commerce
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APPEAL FROM T H E UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR T H E
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

No 73-898 Argued October 16, 1974—Decided January 22, 1975
Appellee Ohio public high school students who had been suspended
from school for misconduct for up to 10 days without a hearing, brought a class action against appellant school officials seeking
a declaration that the Ohio statute permitting such suspensions was
unconstitutional and an order enjoining the officials to remove the
references to the suspensions from the student5' records A threeludge District Court declared that appellees were denied due
process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because
they were "suspended without hearing prior to suspension or
withm a reasonable time thereafter " and that the statute and
implementing regulations were unconstitutional and granted the
requested injunction Held
1 Students facing temporary suspension from a public school
have property and hbertv interests that qualify for protection
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
Pp 572-576
(a) Having chosen to extend the right to an education to
people of appellees' class generalh Ohio may not withdraw that
right on grounds of misconduct absent fundamentally fair procedures to determine whether the misconduct has occurred, and
must recognize a student's legitimate entitlement to a public
education as a property interest that is protected by the Due
Process Clause, and that ma\ not be taken iwa> for misconduct
without observing minimum procedures required by that Clause
Pp 573-574
(b) Since misconduct charges if sustained and recorded could
seriously damage the students' reputation as well as interfere with
later educational and employment opportunities, the State's
claimed nght to determine unilateral^ and without process
whether that misconduct has occurred immediately collides with
the Due Process Clause's prohibition against arbitrary deprivation of liberty Pp 574-575
(c) A 10-day suspension from school is not de minimis and
ma> not be imposed in complete disregard of the Due Process
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Clause. Neither the property interest in educational benefits
temporarily denied nor the liberty interest in reputation is so
insubstantial that suspensions may constitutionally be imposed
by any procedure the school chooses, no matter how arbitrary.
Pp. 575-576.
2. Due process requires, in connection with a suspension of 10
days or less, that the student be given oral or written notice of
the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation
of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present
his version. Generally, notice and hearing should precede the
student's removal from school, since the hearing may almost
immediately follow the misconduct, but if prior notice and hearing
are not feasible, as where the student's presence endangers persons
or property or threatens disruption of the academic process, thus
justifying immediate removal from school, the necessary notice
and hearing should follow as soon as practicable. Pp. 577-584.
372 F. Supp. 1279, affirmed.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which DOUGLAS,
BRENNAN, STEWART, and MARSHALL, JJ , joined.

POWELL, J., filed

a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., and BLACKMUN and
REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, post, p. 584.

Thomas A. Bustin argued the cause for appellants.
With him on the briefs were James / . Hughes, Jr., Robert
A. Bell, and Patrick M. McGrath.
Peter D. Roos argued the cause for appellees. With
him on the brief were Denis Murphy and Kenneth C.
Cur tin.*
*John F. Lewis filed a brief for the Buckeye Association of School
Administrators et al. as arnici curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amid curiae urging affirmance were filed by David
Bonderman, Peter Van A\ Lockwood, Paul L. Tractenberg, David
Rubin, and W. William Hodes for the National Committee for Citizens in Education et a l ; by Alan H. Levine, Melvin L. Wulj, and
Joel M. Gora for the American Civil Liberties Union; by Robert H.
Kapp, R. Stephen Browning, and Nathaniel R. Jones for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People et a l ;
and by Marian Wright Edelman for the Children's Defense Fund of
the Washington Research Project, Inc., et al.
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M R . JUSTICE'WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

This appeal by various administrators of the Columbus,
Ohio, Public School System (CPSS) challenges the
judgment of a three-judge federal court, declaring that
appellees—various high school students in the CPSS—
were denied due process of law contrary to the command
of the Fourteenth Amendment in that they were temporarily suspended from their high schools without a
hearing either prior to suspension or within a reasonable
time thereafter, and enjoining the administrators to
remove all references to such suspensions from the students' records.
I
Ohio law, Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.64 (1972), provides for
free education to all children between the ages of six and
21. Section 3313.66 of the Code empowers the principal
of an Ohio public school to suspend a pupil for misconduct for up to 10 days or to expel him. In either case, he
must notify the student's parents within 24 hours
and state the reasons for his action. A pupil who is expelled, or his parents, may appeal the decision to the
Board of Education and in connection therewith shall be
permitted to be heard at the board meeting. The Board
may reinstate the pupil following the hearing. No similar procedure is provided in § 3313.66 or any other provision of state law for a suspended student. Aside from
a regulation tracking the statute, at the time of the imposition of the suspensions in this case the CPSS itself had
not issued any written procedure applicable to suspensions. 1 Nor, so far as the record reflects, had any of
1
At the time of the events involved in this case, the only administrative regulation on this subject was § 1010.04 of the Administrative Guide of the Columbus Public Schools which provided:
"Pupils may be suspended or expelled from school in accordance
with the provisions of Section 3313.66 of the Revised Code." Subse-
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the individual high schools involved in this case.2 Each,
however, had formally or informally described the conduct for which suspension could be imposed.
The nine named appellees, each of whom alleged that
he or she had been suspended from public high school in
Columbus for up to 10 davs without a hearing pursuant
to § 3313 66 filed an action under 42 U S C § 1983
against the Columbus Board of Education and various
administrators of the CPSS The complaint sought a
quent to the e\enU imohed in this lawsuit the Department of Pupil
Personnel of the CPSS issued three memoranda relating to suspension
procedure^ dated August 16 1971, Februan 21, 1973, and Julj 10,
1973, respectneh
The first two are substantially similar to each
other and require no factfinding hearing at am time in connection
with a suspension The third which was apparently m effect when
this case was argued places upon the principal the obligation to
"investigate" "before commencing suspension procedures", and
pro\ ides as part of the procedures that the principal shall discuss the
case with the pupil so that the pupil ma-\ "be heard with respect to
the alleged offense/' unless the pupil is "unavailable" for such a
discussion or "unwilling" to participate in it The suspensions m\olved m this case occurred, and records thereof were made, prior
to the effectne date of these memoranda
The District
Court's judgment, including its expunction order, turns on the propriety of the procedures existing at the time the suspensions were
ordered and bv which the}' were imposed
2
According to the testimom of Phillip Fulton, the principal of one
of the high schools invoked in this case, there was an informal
procedure applicable at the Marion-Franklin High School It provided that in the routine case of misconduct, occurring in the presence of a teacher, the teacher would describe the misconduct on a
form provided for that purpose and would send the student, with
the form, to the principal's office There, the principal would
obtain the student's version of the story, and, if it conflicted with the
teacher's written version, would send for the teacher to obtain the
teacher's oral version—apparentlv in the presence of the student
Mr Fulton testified that if a discrepant still existed, the teacher's
version would be believed and the principal would arrive at a disciphnan decision based on it
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declaration that § 3313.66 was unconstitutional in that it
permitted public school administrators to deprive plaintiffs of their rights to an education without a hearing of
any kind, in violation of the procedural due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment. It also sought to
enjoin the public school officials from issuing future suspensions pursuant to § 3313.66 and to require them to
remove references to the past suspensions from the
records of the students in question.3
The proof below established that the suspensions
arose out of a period of widespread student unrest
in the CPSS during February and March 1971.
Six of the named plaintiffs, Rudolph Sutton, Tyrone
Washington, Susan Cooper, Deborah Fox, Clarence Byars,
and Bruce Harris, were students at the Marion-Franklin
High School and were each suspended for 10 days 4 on
account of disruptive or disobedient conduct committed
in the presence of the school administrator who ordered
the suspension One of these, Tyrone Washington, was
among a group of students demonstrating in the school
auditorium while a class was being conducted there. He
was ordered by the school principal to leave, refused
3
The plaintiffs sought to bring the action on behalf of all students
of the Columbus Public Schools suspended on or after February
1971, and a class action was declared accordingly Since the complaint sought to restram the "enforcement" and "operation" of a
state statute "by restraining the action of any officer of such state
in the enforcement or execution of such statute," a three-judge court
was requested pursuant to 28 U S C §2281 and convened The
students also alleged that the conduct for which they could be suspended was not adequately defined by Ohio law This vagueness
and overbreadth argument was rejected by the court below and the
students have not appealed from this part of the court's decision
4
Fox was given two separate 10-day suspensions for misconduct
occurring on two separate occasions—the second following immediately upon her return to school In addition to his suspension, Sutton was transferred to another school
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to do so, and was suspended Rudolph Sutton, in the
presence of the principal, physically attacked a police
officer who was attempting to remove Tyrone Washington
from the auditorium He was immediately suspended
The other four Marion-Franklin students were suspended
for similar conduct None was given a hearing to determine the operative facts underlying the suspension,
but each, together with his or her parents, was offered the
opportunity to attend a conference, subsequent to the
effective date of the suspension to discuss the student's
future
Two named plaintiffs, Dwight Lopez and Betty Crome,
were students at the Central High School and McGuffey
Junior High School respectively The former was suspended m connection with a disturbance m the lunchroom which involved some physical damage to school
property 5 Lopez testified that at least 75 other students
were suspended from his school on the same day He also
testified below that he was not a party to the destructive
conduct but was instead an innocent bystander Because no one from the school testified with regard to this
incident, there is no evidence in the record indicating
the official basis for concluding otherwise Lopez never
had a hearing
Betty Crome was present at a demonstration at a high
school other than the one she was attending There
she was arrested together with others taken to the police
station and released without being formally charged
Before she went to school on the following day, she was

notified that she had been suspended for a 10-day period
Because no one from the school testified with respect to
this incident, the record does not disclose how the McGuffey Junior High School principal went about making
the decision to suspend Crome, nor does it disclose
on what information the decision was based It is clear
from the record that no hearing was ever held
There was no testimony with respect to the suspension
of the ninth named plaintiff, Carl Smith The school
files were also silent as to his suspension, although as to
some, but not all, of the other named plaintiffs the files
contained either direct references to their suspensions
or copies of letters sent to their parents advising them
of the suspension
On the basis of this evidence the three-judge court
declared that plaintiffs were denied due process of law
because they were "suspended without hearing prior to
suspension or within a reasonable time thereafter/' and
that Ohio Rev Code Ann § 3313 66 (1972) and regulations issued pursuant thereto were unconstitutional in
permitting such suspensionsc It was ordered that all
references to plaintiffs' suspensions be removed from
school files
Although not imposing upon the Ohio school administrators any particular disciplinary procedures and leaving
them "free to adopt regulations providing for fair suspension procedures which are consonant with the educational
goals of their schools and reflective of the characteristics
of their school and locality/' the District Court declared

*• Lopez was actualh absent from school following his suspension
for over 20 davs This seems to have occurred because of a misunderstanding as to the length of the suspension A letter sent to
Lopez after he had been out for over 10 da>s purports to assume
that being over compulsory school age, he was voluntarily staying
awa\ Upon asserting that this was not the case, Lopez was transferred to another school

6
In its judgment, the court stated that the statute is unconstitutional in that it provides for suspension
without first affording
the student due process of law " (Emphasis supplied ) However, the
language of the judgment must be read m light of the language m
the opmion which expressly contemplates that under some circumstances students may properh be removed from school before a
hearmg is held so long as the hearing follows promptly
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that there were "minimum requirements of notice and
a hearing prior to suspension, except in emergency situations." In explication, the court stated that relevant
case authority would: (1) permit "[ijmmediate removal
of a student whose conduct disrupts the academic atmosphere of the school, endangers fellow students, teachers or school officials, or damages property"; (2) require
notice of suspension proceedings to be sent to the student's parents within 24 hours of the decision to conduct
them; and (3) require a hearing to be held, with the student present, within 72 hours of his removal. Finally,
the court stated that, with respect to the nature of the
hearing, the relevant cases required that statements in
support of the charge be produced, that the student and
others be permitted to make statements in defense or
mitigation, and that the school need not permit attendance by counsel.
The defendant school administrators have appealed
the three-judge court's decision. Because the order below
granted plaintiffs' request for an injunction—ordering defendants to expunge their records—this Court has jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1253.
We affirm.
II
At the outset, appellants contend that because there is
no constitutional right to an education at public expense,
the Due Process Clause does not protect against expulsions from the public school system. This position
misconceives the nature of the issue and is refuted by
prior decisions. The Fourteenth Amendment forbids
the State to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. Protected interests in property are normally "not created by the Constitution.
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined"
by an independent source such as state statutes or rules
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entitling the citizen to certain benefits. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 577 (1972).
Accordingly, a state employee who under state law,
or rules promulgated by state officials, has a legitimate
claim of entitlement to continued employment absent
sufficient cause for discharge may demand the procedural
protections of due process. Connell v. Higginbotham,
403 U. S. 207 (1971); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S.
183, 191-192 (1952); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134,
164 (POWELL, J., concurring), 171 (WHITE, J., concurring
and dissenting) (1974). So may welfare recipients
who have statutory rights to welfare as long as they
maintain the specified qualifications. Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U. S. 254 (1970). Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471
(1972), applied the limitations of the Due Process Clause
to governmental decisions to revoke parole, although a
parolee has no constitutional right to that status. In
like vein was Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539 (1974),
where the procedural protections of the Due Process
Clause were triggered by official cancellation of a prisoner's good-time credits accumulated under state law,
although those benefits were not mandated by the
Constitution.
Here, on the basis of state law, appellees plainly had
legitimate claims of entitlement to a public education.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 3313.48 and 3313.64 (1972 and
Supp. 1973) direct local authorities to provide a free education to all residents between five and 21 years of age,
and a compulsory-attendance law requires attendance
for a school year of not less than 32 weeks. Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. §3321.04 (1972). It is true that §3313.66
of the Code permits school principals to suspend
students for up to 10 days; but suspensions may
not be imposed without any grounds whatsoever. All
of the schools had their own rules specifying the
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grounds for expulsion or suspension. Having chosen to
extend the right to an education to people of appellees'
class generally, Ohio may not withdraw that right on
grounds of misconduct, absent fundamentally fair procedures to determine whether the misconduct has occurred. Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, at 164 (POWELL, J.,
concurring), 171 ( W H I T E , J., concurring and dissenting),
206 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting).

Although Ohio may not be constitutionally obligated
to establish and maintain a public school system, it has
nevertheless done so and has required its children to attend. Those young people do not "shed their constitutional rights" at the schoolhouse door. Tinker v.
Des Moines School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). "The
Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States,
protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its
creatures—Boards of Education not excepted."
West
Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624,
637 (1943). The authority possessed by the State to
prescribe and enforce standards of conduct in its schools
although concededlv very broad, must be exercised consistently with constitutional safeguards. Among other
things the State is constrained to recognize a student's
legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property
interest which is protected by the Due Process Clause
and which may not be taken away for misconduct without adherence to the minimum procedures required by
that Clause.
The Due Process Clause also forbids arbitrary deprivations of liberty. "Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the
government is doing to him," the minimal requirements
of the Clause must be satisfied. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433, 437 (1971); Board of Regents v.
Roth, supra, at 573. School authorities here suspended
appellees from school for periods of up to 10 days
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based on charges of misconduct. If sustained and recorded, those charges could seriously damage the students'
standing with their fellow pupils and their teachers as well
as interfere with later opportunities for higher education
and employment. 7 I t is apparent that the claimed right
of the State to determine unilaterally and without process
whether that misconduct has occurred immediately collides with the requirements of the Constitution.
Appellants proceed to argue that even if there is a
right to a public education protected by the Due Process
Clause generally, the Clause comes into play only when
the State subjects a student to a "severe detriment or
grievous loss." The loss of 10 days, it is said, is neither
severe nor grievous and the Due Process Clause is therefore of no relevance. Appellants' argument is again refuted by our prior decisions; for in determining "whether
due process requirements apply in the first place, we must
look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest
7

Appellees assert in their brief that four of 12 randomly selected
Ohio colleges specificalh inquire of the high school of every applicant
for admission whether the applicant has ever been suspended
Brief
for Appellees 34-35 and n 40 Appellees also contend that many
employers request similar information
Ibid
Congress has recently enacted legislation limiting access to information contained in the files of a school receiving federal funds
Section 513 of the Education Amendments of 1974, Pub L 93-380,
88 Stat 571, 20 U S C § 1232g (1970 ed , Supp IV), adding §438
to the General Education Provisions Act That section would preclude release of "verified reports of serious or recurrent behavior
patterns" to employers without written consent of the student's
parents While subsection (b)(1)(B) permits release of such information to "other schools
in which the student intends to
enroll," it does so only upon condition that the parent be advised
of the release of the information and be given an opportunity at
a heanng to challenge the content of the information to insure
against inclusion of inaccurate or misleading information
The statute does not expressly state whether the parent can contest the underlying basis for a suspension, the fact of which is contained in the
student's school record.
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at stake." Board oj Regents v. Roth, supra, at 570-571.
Appellees were excluded from school only temporarily, it
is true, but the length and consequent severity of a deprivation, while another factor to weigh in determining the
appropriate form of hearing, "is not decisive of the basic
right" to a hearing of some kind. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U. S. 67, 86 (1972). The Court's view has been that as
long as a property deprivation is not de minimis, its gravity is irrelevant to the question whether account must be
taken of the Due Process Clause. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337, 342 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring) ; Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 378-379
(1971); Board oj Regents v. Roth, supra, at 570 n. 8.
A 10-day suspension from school is not de minimis in
our view and may not be imposed in complete disregard
of the Due Process Clause.
A short suspension is, of course, a far milder deprivation
than expulsion. But, "education is perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments,"
Brown v. Board oj Education, 347 U. S. 483, 493 (1954),
and the total exclusion from the educational process for
more than a trivial period, and certainly if the suspension
is for 10 days, is a serious event in the life of the suspended child. Neither the property interest in educational benefits temporarily denied nor the liberty interest
in reputation, which is also implicated, is so insubstantial
that suspensions may constitutionally be imposed by any
procedure the school chooses, no matter how arbitrary.8
8
Since the landmark decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in Dixon v. Alabama State Board oj Education, 294
F. 2d 150, cert, denied, 368 U. S. 930 (1961), the lower federal
courts have uniformly held the Due Process Clause applicable to decisions made by tax-supported educational institutions to remove a
student from the institution long enough for the removal to be
classified as an expulsion. Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F. 2d 201, 211
(CA2 1972); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F. 2d 807, 812 (CA2 1967);

565

577

Opinion of the Court

III
"Once it is determined that due process applies, the
question remains what process is due." Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U. S., at 481. We turn to that question, fully
Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F. 2d 1077,
1089 (CA8 1969), cert, denied, 398 U. S. 965 (1970);
Vought v. Van Buren Public Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388 (ED Mich.
1969); Whitfield v. Simpson, 312 F. Supp. 889 (ED 111. 1970);
Fielder v. Board of Education of School District of Winnebago, Neb.,
346 F. Supp. 722, 729 (Neb. 1972); DeJesus v. Penberthy, 344 F.
Supp. 70, 74 (Conn. 1972); Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978,
994 (WD Wis. 1968), aff'd, 418 F. 2d 163 (CA7 1969); Stricklin v.
Regents of University of Wisconsin, 297 F. Supp.. 416, 420 (WD Wis.
1969), appeal dismissed, 420 F. 2d 1257 (CA7 1970); Buck v. Carter,
308 F. Supp. 1246 (WD Wis. 1970); General Order on Judicial
Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F. R. D.
133, 147-148 (WD Mo. 1968) (en banc). The lower courts have been
less uniform, however, on the question whether removal from school
for some shorter period may ever be so trivial a deprivation as to
require no process, and, if so, how short the removal must be to
qualify. Courts of Appeals have held or assumed the Due Process
Clause applicable to long suspensions, Pervis v. LaMarque Ind.
School Dist., 466 F. 2d 1054 (CA5 1972); to indefinite suspensions,
Sullivan v. Houston Ind. School Dist., 475 F. 2d 1071 (CA5),
cert, denied, 414 U. S. 1032 (1973); to the addition of a 30-day
suspension to a 10-day suspension, Williams v. Dade County School
Board, 441 F. 2d 299 (CA5 1971); to a 10-day suspension, Black Students of North Fort Myers Jr.-Sr. High School v. Williams, 470 F. 2d
957 (CA5 1972); to "mild" suspensions, Farrell v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160
(CA2 1971), and Tate v. Board of Education, 453 F. 2d 975 (CA8
1972); and to a three-day suspension, Shanley v. Northeast Ind.
School Dist., Bexar County, Texas, 462 F. 2d 960, 967 n. 4 (CA5
1972); but inapplicable to a seven-day suspension, Linwood v. Board
of Ed. of City of Peoria, 463 F. 2d 763 (CA7), cert, denied,
409 U . S . 1027 (1972); to a three-day suspension, Dunn v. Tyler
Ind. School Dist., 460 F. 2d 137 (CA5 1972); to a suspension for
not "more than a few days," Murray v. West Baton Rouge Parish
School Board, 472 F. 2d 438 (CA5 1973); and to all suspensions no
matter how short, Black Coalition v. Portland School District No. 1,
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realizing as our cases regularly do that the interpretation
and application of the Due Process Clause are intensely
practical matters and that "[t]he very nature of due
process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation." Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961).
We are also mindful of our own admonition:
"Judicial interposition in the operation of the public school system of the Nation raises problems requiring care and restraint. . . . By and large, public
education in our Nation is committed to the control
of state and local authorities." Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 104 (1968).
There are certain bench marks to guide us, however.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306
484 F 2d 1040 (CA9 1973) The Federal District Courts have held
the Due Process Clause applicable to an interim suspension pending
expulsion proceedings in Stnckhn \ Regents of University of Wisconsin, supra, and Buck \ Carter, supra, to a 10-day suspension, Banks
\ Board of Public Instruction of Dade County, 314 F Supp 285 (SD
Fla 1970), vacated, 401 TJ S 988 (1971) (for entry of a fresh decree
so that a timely appeal might be taken to the Court of Appeals), aff'd,
450 F 2d 1103 (CAS 1971), to suspensions of under five days, Vail v
Board of Education of Portsmouth School Dist, 354 F Supp 592
(NH 1973), and to all suspensions, Mills v Board of Education
of the Dist of Columbia, 348 F Supp 866 (DC 1972), and
Givens \ Poe, 346 F Supp 202 (WDNC 1972), but inapplicable to
suspensions of 25 days, Hernandez v. School District Number One,
Denver, Colorado, 315 F Supp 289 (Colo 1970); to suspensions
of 10 days, Baker v Downey City Board of Education, 307 F Supp.
517 (CD Cal 1969), and to suspensions of eight davs, Hatter v Los
Anqeles City High School District, 310 F Supp 1309 (CD Cal.
1970), rev'd on other grounds, 452 F 2d 673 (CA9 1971) In the
cases holding no process necessary m connection with short suspensions, it is not always clear whether the court viewed the Due
Process Clause as inapplicable, or simply felt that the process
received was "due" even m the absence of some kind of hearing
procedure.
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(1950), a case»often invoked by later opinions, said that
"[mjany controversies have raged about the cryptic and
abstract words of the Due Process Clause but there can
be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be
preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." Id., at 313. "The
fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard," Grannis v. Or dean, 234 U. S. 385,
394 (1914), a right that "has little reality or worth unless
one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose
for himself whether to . . . contest." Mullane v. Central
Hanover Trust Co., supra, at 314. See also Armstrong v.
Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 550 (1965); Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 168-169 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). At the very minimum, therefore,
students facing suspension and the consequent interference
with a protected property interest must be given some
kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing. "Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be
heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they
must first be notified." Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223,
233 (1864).
It also appears from our cases that the timing and
content of the notice and the nature of the hearing will
depend on appropriate accommodation of the competing
interests involved. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, supra,
at 895; Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, at 481. The student's interest is to avoid unfair or mistaken exclusion
from the educational process, with all of its unfortunate
consequences. The Due Process Clause will not shield
him from suspensions properly imposed, but it disserves
both his interest and the interest of the State if his suspension is in fact unwarranted. The concern would be
mostly academic if the disciplinary process were a totally
accurate, unerring process, never mistaken and never
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unfair. Unfortunately, that is not the case, and no one
suggests that it is. Disciplinarians, although proceeding
in utmost good faith, frequently act on the reports and
advice of others; and the controlling facts and the nature
of the conduct under challenge are often disputed. The
risk of error is not at all trivial, and it should be guarded
against if that may be done without prohibitive cost or
interference with the educational process.
The difficulty is that our schools are vast and complex.
Some modicum of discipline and order is essential if the
educational function is to be performed. Events calling
for discipline are frequent occurrences and sometimes require immediate, effective action. Suspension is considered not only to be a necessary tool to maintain order
but a valuable educational device. The prospect of imposing elaborate hearing requirements in every suspension
case is viewed with great concern, and many school authorities may well prefer the untrammeled power to act
unilaterally, unhampered by rules about notice and hearing. But it would be a strange disciplinary system in an
educational institution if no communication was sought
by the disciplinarian with the student in an effort to inform him of his dereliction and to let him tell his side of
the story in order to make sure that an injustice is not
done. "[FJairness can rarely be obtained by secret, onesided determination of facts decisive of rights. . . ."
"Secrecy is not congenial to truth-seeking and selfrighteousness gives too slender an assurance of Tightness.
No better instrument has been devised for arriving at
truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss
notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet
it/' Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, supra, at 170,
171-172 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).9
9

The facts involved in this case illustrate the point. Betty Crome
was suspended for conduct which did not occur on school grounds,
and for which mass arrests were made—hardly guaranteeing careful
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We do not believe that school authorities must be
totally free from notice and hearing requirements if their
schools are to operate with acceptable efficiency. Students facing temporary suspension have interests qualifying for protection of the Due Process Clause, and due
process requires, in connection with a suspension of 10
days or less, that the student be given oral or written
notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them,
an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and
an opportunity to present his side of the story. The
Clause requires at least these rudimentary precautions
against unfair or mistaken findings of misconduct and
arbitrary exclusion from school.10
individualized factfinding by the police or by the school principal.
She claims to have been involved in no misconduct. However, she
was suspended for 10 days without ever being told what she was
accused of doing or being given an opportunity to explain her presence among those arrested. Similarly, Dwight Lopez was suspended,
along with many others, in connection with a disturbance in the
lunchroom. Lopez says he was not one of those in the lunchroom
who was involved. However, he was never told the basis for the
principal's belief that he was involved, nor was he ever given an
opportunity to explain his presence in the lunchroom. The school
principals who suspended Crome and Lopez may have been correct
on the merits, but it is inconsistent with the Due Process Clause to
have made the decision that misconduct had occurred without at
some meaningful time giving Crome or Lopez an opportunity to
persuade the principals otherwise.
We recognize that both suspensions were imposed during a time
of great difficulty for the school administrations involved. At least
in Lopez' case there may have been an immediate need to send home
everyone in the lunchroom in order to preserve school order and
property; and the administrative burden of providing 75 "hearings"
of any kind is considerable. However, neither factor justifies a
disciplinary suspension without at any time gathering facts relating
to Lopez specifically, confronting him with them, and giving him an
opportunity to explain.
10
Appellants point to the fact that some process is provided under
Ohio law by way of judicial review. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2506.01
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There need be no delay between the time "notice" is
given and the time of the hearing. In the great majority
of cases the disciplinarian may informally discuss the
alleged misconduct with the student minutes after it has
occurred. We hold only that, in being given an opportunity to explain his version of the facts at this discussion, the student first be told what he is accused of doing
and what the basis of the accusation is. Lower courts
which have addressed the question of the nature of the
procedures required in short suspension cases have
reached the same conclusion. Tate v. Board of Education, 453 F. 2d 975, 979 (CA8 1972); Vail v. Board of Education, 354 F. Supp. 592, 603 (NH 1973). Since
the hearing may occur almost immediately following
the misconduct, it follows that as a general rule
notice and hearing should precede removal of the student
from school. We agree with the District Court, however,
that there are recurring situations in which prior notice
and hearing cannot be insisted upon. Students whose
presence poses a continuing danger to persons or property
or an ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process
may be immediately removed from school. In such cases,
the necessary notice and rudimentary hearing should fol(Supp 1973) Appellants do not cite any case in which this general
administrative review statute has been used to appeal from a disciplinary decision b\ a school official If it be assumed that it could
be so used, it is for two reasons insufficient to save inadequate procedures at the school level First, although new proof may be offered
in a § 2501 06 proceeding. Shaker Coventry Corp v Shaker Heights
Planning Comm'n, 18 Ohio Op 2d 272, 176 N E 2d 332 (1961), the
proceeding is not de novo. In re Locke, 33 Ohio App 2d 177, 294
N E 2d 230 (1972). Thus the decision by the school—even if made
upon inadequate procedures—is entitled to weight in the court proceeding Second, without a demonstration to the contrary, we must
assume that delay will attend any § 2501.06 proceeding, that the
suspension will not be stayed pending hearing, and that the student
meanwhile will irreparably lose his educational benefits
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low as soon as practicable, as the District Court indicated.
In holding as we do, we do not believe that we have
imposed procedures on school disciplinarians which are
inappropriate in a classroom setting. Instead we have
imposed requirements which are, if anything, less than
a fair-minded school principal would impose upon himself in order to avoid unfair suspensions. Indeed, according to the testimony of the principal of Marion-Franklin
High School, that school had an informal procedure,
remarkably similar to that which we now require, applicable to suspensions generally but which was not followed in this case. Similarly, according to the most
recent memorandum applicable to the entire CPSS, see
n. 1, supra, school principals in the CPSS are now
required by local rule to provide at least as much as the
constitutional minimum which we have described.
We stop short of construing the Due Process Clause
to require, countrywide, that hearings in connection with
short suspensions must afford the student the opportunity
to secure counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses
supporting the charge, or to call his own witnesses to
verify his version of the incident. Brief disciplinary
suspensions are almost countless. To impose in each
such case even truncated trial-type procedures might well
overwhelm administrative facilities in many places and,
by diverting resources, cost more than it would save in educational effectiveness. Moreover, further formalizing
the suspension process and escalating its formality and
adversary nature may not only make it too costly as a
regular disciplinary tool but also destroy its effectiveness
as part of the teaching process.
On the other hand, requiring effective notice and informal hearing permitting the student to give his version
of the events will provide a meaningful hedge against
erroneous action. At least the disciplinarian will be
alerted to the existence of disputes about facts and argu-
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merits about cause and effect. He may then determine
himself to summon the accuser, permit cross-examination,
and allow the student to present his own witnesses. In
more difficult cases, he may permit counsel. In any
event, his discretion will be more informed and we think
the risk of error substantially reduced.
Requiring that there be at least an informal give-andtake between student and disciplinarian, preferably prior
to the suspension, will add little to the factfinding function where the disciplinarian himself has witnessed the
conduct forming the basis for the charge. But things
are not always as they seem to be, and the student will at
least have the opportunity to characterize his conduct
and put it in what he deems the proper context.
We should also make it clear that we have addressed
ourselves solely to the short suspension, not exceeding
10 days. Longer suspensions or expulsions for the remainder of the school term, or permanently, may require
more formal procedures. Nor do we put aside the possibility that in unusual situations, although involving only
a short suspension, something more than the rudimentary
procedures will be required.
IV
The District Court found each of the suspensions involved here to have occurred without a hearing, either
before or after the suspension, and that each suspension
was therefore invalid and the statute unconstitutional
insofar as it permits such suspensions without notice or
hearing. Accordingly, the judgment is
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom T H E CHIEF JUSTICE,
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST

join, dissenting.
The Court today invalidates an Ohio statute that permits student suspensions from school without a hearing
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"for not more than ten days/' * The decision unnecessarily opens avenues for judicial intervention in the
operation of our public schools that may affect adversely
the quality of education. The Court holds for the first
time that the federal courts, rather than educational
officials and state legislatures, have the authority to
determine the rules applicable to routine classroom discipline of children and teenagers in the public schools. It
justifies this unprecedented intrusion into the process of
elementary and secondary education by identifying a
new constitutional right: the right of a student not to
be suspended for as much as a single day without notice
and a due process hearing either before or promptly following the suspension.2
The Court's decision rests on the premise that, under
Ohio law, education is a property interest protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and
therefore that any suspension requires notice and a hearing.3 In my view, a student's interest in education is
1
The Ohio statute, Ohio Rev Code Ann § 3313 66 (1972), actually
is a limitation on the time-honored practice of school authorities themselves determining the appropriate duration of suspensions
The
statute allows the superintendent or principal of a public school to
suspend a pupil "for not more than ten days
" (italics supplied),
and requires notification to the parent or guardian in writing withm
24 hours of am suspension
2
Section 3313 66 also provides authority for the expulsion of pupils,
but requires a hearing thereon by the school board upon request of
a parent or guardian The rights of pupils expelled are not involved
in this case, which concerns only the limited discretion of school
authorities to suspend for not more than 10 days Expulsion, usually
resulting at least in loss of a school year or semester, is an incomparably more serious matter than the brief suspension, traditionally
used as the principal sanction for enforcing routine discipline The
Ohio statute recognizes this distinction
3
The Court speaks of "exclusion from the educational process
for more than a trivial period
," ante, at 576, but its opinion
makes clear that even one day's suspension invokes the constitutional
procedure mandated today.
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Rule 56, Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A parly see Jung to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof,
(b) For defending party. A pnrty against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cioss-claim is asserted or a declai atory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part tbejeof.
(c) Motion and proceedings (hereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law, A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon t V whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall he made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as v/ould be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
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RORY J. ATCITTY, by and
through his parent Roger

]

Atcitty, Sr.,

]

Plaintiff and Appellant,

) Case No. 980096-CA
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BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
SAN JUAN COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT, LYMAN GROVER,
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Priority No. 15

Defendants and Appellees.

ADDENDUM
4. Trial Court Rulings.
4a. Ruling On Plaintiff7s Motion For
Partial Summary Judgment.

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
fc?"\n Juan County
r,LED

JIM. - 9 1997
a Eni< or THF coum

AA

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RORY J. ATCITTY, by and
through his parent ROGER
ATCITTY, SR.,

:
:
:

RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
SAN JUAN COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT, LYMAN GROVER,

:
:
:

Defendant.

:

Civil No. 9607-39

Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment supported by
Memorandum to which the Defendants filed a responsive Memorandum.
The Court heard oral argument, took the matter under advisement,
and now issues this ruling.
The exhibits reveal that on May 16, 1996, the Plaintiff was
suspended from Whitehorse High School for ten days by Principal
Lyman Grover.

As grounds for summary judgment Plaintiff asserts

that (1) the Board policies and procedures governing suspension and
expulsion are vague and ambiguous, (2) the Plaintiff was not

8^

2

afforded

a

right

disciplinarian,
provided

with

to

was
an

be

not

heard,

(3)

impartial,

opportunity

to

Mr.

(4) the
be

heard

Lyman

Grover,

Plaintiff
in

was

mitigation

as
not
of

punishment, and (5) Plaintiff was deprived of liberty interests.
The Court rejects assertions (1), (3), and (5) for the reason
that they were not pled in the Complaint and are raised for the
first time in Plaintiff's memorandum.

To consider those assertions

first raised in a dispositive Motion would deprive the Defendants
of

adequate

pleadings.

notice

and

permit

unilateral

amendment

of

the

The Court also finds that case law has held that there

is no inherent conflict when a Principal acts in a dual capacity as
an investigator and disciplinarian (Arrington v.Eberhard), nor are
the

District

policies

ambiguous

with

reference

to

how

the

administrator should conduct due process and suspension in the
case .
The Court also finds that in the context of Plaintiff's Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment there is a genuine issue of material
fact which precludes summary judgment m

favor of Plaintiff on the

issue of whether Plaintiff was given an opportunity to be heard
with regard to the alleged conduct of the Plaintiff and in

3

mitigation of punishment.

There are facts which, if believed by

the fact finder, would indicate that the Plaintiff was afforded an
opportunity to be heard on at least one occasion within the meaning
of the Goss decision.
The Court also rejects the notion that this is an unusual case
entitling Plaintiff to any "enhanced" due process or additional
safeguards other than that contemplated by Goss.
is

basically

"an

informal

give-and-take

The due process

between

student

and

disciplinarian."
The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is therefore denied.
DATED this

/

day of July, 1997.

BRYCE/K. BRYNER
District Court Judge1

4
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Defendants and Appellees.

ADDENDUM
4. Trial Court Rulings.
4b

Ruling On Defendants7 Motion
For Summary Judgment.

SEVENTH DISTRICT C0UR1
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RORY J. ATCITTY, by and
through his parent ROGER
ATCITTY, SR.,

:
:
:

RULING ON DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
SAN JUAN COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT, LYMAN GROVER,

:

Defendant.

:

Civil No. 9607-39

Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment claiming that
there is no genuine issue as to the material facts set forth in its
Memorandum.
Opposition.

Plaintiff

responded

by

filing

a

Memorandum

in

The Court heard the oral argument of the parties, took

the matter under advisement, and now issues this Ruling.
Plaintiff's sole claim for relief in his Complaint asserts
that he was denied a due process hearing concerning his expulsion.
It is clear that the Plaintiff in this case was suspended from
Whitehorse High School for a period of ten days by Principal Lyman

i<^

2

Grover

on May

16, 1997.

Suspensions

of ten days or

less are

governed by the holding in Goss vs. Lopez and this Court gives
deference to the principles enunciated in that case.

Plaintiff is

therefore entitled to the due process protections clearly defined
by

that

case

which

are:

(1) Plaintiff

shall

be given

oral

or

written notice of the charges against him, and if he denies them,
(2) an explanation of the evidence that the authorities have, and
(3) an opportunity to present his side of the story.
The Court is satisfied from the depositions, Affidavits, and
pleadings on file that the Plaintiff was given oral notice of the
charges against him together with an explanation of the evidence
against

him, and that

he was given

an opportunity

on

several

occasions to present his side of the story in an informal setting.
The Court

finds that the requirements of Goss were met and that

there are no genuine issues of material facts on these elements.
The

Court

therefore

finds

that

Plaintiff

was not denied

a due

process hearing as claimed in his Complaint and that Defendants are
entitled to a summary judgment as a matter of law.
From the pleadings, Affidavits, and depositions on file the
Court cannot find that the Complaint was frivolous.

Plaintiff

3

presented a tenable position, portions of which could be deemed to
be supported by case law.

Defendants' application for attorney

fees is therefore denied.
DATED this /

day of July, 1997.

^

BRYCE Yp BRYNEI
/7

District Court Judge
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Ruling On Motion To Strike
Affidavit Of Lyman Grover.

Priority No. 15
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT '
SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RORY J. ATCITTY, by and
through his parent ROGER
ATCITTY, SR.,

:
:
:

fcpuiy

RULING ON MOTION TO
STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF
LYMAN GROVER

Plaintiff,
vs.

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
SAN JUAN COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT, LYMAN GROVER,

:
:

Defendant.

:

Civil No. 9607-39

Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Lyman
Grover supported by Memorandum to which the Defendants filed a
Memorandum in Opposition.

The Court now rules as follows:

The Court has reviewed and compared the deposition testimony
of Lyman Grover with his Affidavit in detail and cannot find that
there are any material or substantial inconsistencies between them
regarding the issues of whether the Plaintiff and his father were
afforded an adequate and timely opportunity to be heard in regards
to the charges, and whether Lyman Grover acted in a dual role as a

stf

school disciplinarian and law enforcement agent.

The Court also

finds that the Defendants did not engage in delay or bad faith by
submitting the Affidavit.
For the reasons above stated the Motion to Strike is denied.
DATED this

/

day of July, 1997.

District Court Judge

3

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the
and correct

fl

(y

day of July, 1997, a true

copy of the foregoing RULING ON MOTION TO STRIKE

AFFIDAVIT OF LYMAN GROVER was mailed, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Eric P. Swenson
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 94 0
Monticello, Utah

84535

Rosalie Reilly
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 4 04
Monticello, Utah

84535

L. Robert Anderson
Daniel G. Anderson
ANDERSON & ANDERSON, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
81 East 100 South
P.O. Box 275
Monticello, Utah 84535
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ADDENDUM
4. Trial Court Rulings.
4d

Ruling On Motion For Leave
To File An Amended Complaint.

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Sr.n Juan County
FILED

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

:
:
:

RORY J. ATCITTY, by and
through his parent ROGER
ATCITTY, SR.,

nY

JUL - 9 1937
CLEU.oi- IMC
iiwJiy

RULING ON MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE AN
AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs .

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
SAN JUAN COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT, LYMAN GROVER,

:

Defendant.

:

Civil No. 9607-39

On March 6, 1997 the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to
File an Amended Complaint

together with Memorandum to which

Defendants filed a Memorandum in Opposition.

the

The Court heard oral

argument, took the matter under advisement, and now issues

this

Ruling.
The Motion for Leave to Amend is denied for the reasons that:
1.

The Motion filed on March 6, 1997 is untimely.

The

discovery cut-off date was December 27, 1996 and both parties had
completed extensive discovery.

Motions for Summary Judgment were

«u

2

also filed by the parties on February 14, 1997, and February 27,
19 97, respectively.
2.
of

the

To allow the Complaint to be amended at this stage

proceedings

amendment

were

would

prejudice

the

Defendants.

to be allowed, Defendants would

If

the

justifiably be

entitled to conduct discovery to meet the new allegations contained
in the Amended Complaint.

This would result in additional expenses

and investments of time and resources to Defendants, all of which
could have been avoided had the Motion been timely made.
3.

The Court rejects Plaintiff's characterization of

the proposed amendments as merely setting forth facts learned in
the discovery process.
Complaint
entitled

sets
to

The Court finds that the proposed Amended

forth new

respond,

issues

discover,

to which Defendants
and

file

dispositive

resulting in delay of a final resolution of this matter.

it!
DATED this /

day of July, 1997.

BRYCE/K. BRYNER
District Court Judge

would

be

Motions,

3
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